Support The Israel ProjectSubsrcibe to our newsletter
Photo Gallery
Video Player
Blog/Audio
Press Releases
Take Action
Expert Sources
Backgrounders
Middle East Glossary
About TIP
Media Fellowship
Volunteer for TIP

Latest videos and podcasts from TIP

| More

                                                                                                  July 26, 2005

Iran and Hezbollah

Iran is one of America's foremost self-proclaimed enemies, and one of the most serious threats to stability in the Middle East. Iran has also been one of the most vociferous opponents of Arab-Israeli peace efforts and a leader of the rejectionist camp that advocates the destruction of Israel.

President Bush said February 16, 2005, "Iran has made it clear that they don't like Israel, to put it bluntly. And the Israelis are concerned about whether or not Iran develops a nuclear weapon, as are we, as should everybody....Clearly, if I was the leader of Israel, and I listened to some of the statements by the Iranian ayatollahs that regarded my security of my country, I'd be concerned about Iran having a nuclear weapon as well."

Mossad chief Meir Dagan believes that, from the technological standpoint, the Iranians will reach the point of no return by the end of 2005, and that the Islamic republic could be nuclear-armed within two years.

Iran claims it wants to develop nuclear energy for civilian purposes, but this makes no sense given the country's enormous reserves of petroleum and gas. In addition, the United States has intelligence indicating Iran is trying to fit missiles to carry nuclear weapons, which only makes sense if Iran was also developing or planning to develop a nuclear capability.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, passed secrets and equipment to Iranian officials. Russia is also helping to rebuild Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactor. The project has provided valuable training to Iranian technicians and engineers, and expanded the regime's nuclear infrastructure. Iran is scheduled to receive low-enriched uranium fuel from Russia for the plant, but, contrary to some reports, Iran did not agree to return the spent fuel to Russia.

Iran purchased special gas from China that could be used to enrich uranium for the production of nuclear weapons. The gas purchase was supposed to be reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but it was concealed instead. Chinese experts have also been involved in the supervision of the installation of centrifuge equipment that can be used to enrich uranium.

In February 2003, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami announced the discovery of uranium reserves near the central city of Yazd and said Iran was setting up production facilities "to make use of advanced nuclear technology for peaceful purposes." This is alarming because it suggests Iran aims to produce and process fuel itself, despite an agreement to obtain all the uranium it would need for civilian purposes from Russia.

Defying a key demand set by 35 nations, Iran confirmed in May 2005 that it had converted 37 tons of uranium into gas, its first acknowledgment of advances made in the production process for enriched uranium. This means Tehran is in a position to start enriching uranium quickly if negotiations over the future of its nuclear program fail. Iran also admitted that it conducted experiments to create plutonium - which is used only in weapons and not for energy production - for five years beyond the date when it previously insisted it had ended all such work. In another sign of Iran's determination to move forward with a nuclear weapons program, the government announced in March 2005 the establishment of a secret nuclear research center to train its scientists in all aspects of atomic technology.

Iran has developed ballistic missiles with a range of 1,200 miles, capable of reaching Israel and U.S. forces in the Middle East. In March 2005, Ukraine admitted that it had exported cruise missiles to Iran that can carry nuclear weapons and target Israel.

Iran is believed to have the capability to produce a variety of biological and chemical weapons. These could be transferred to terrorists or used in warheads to threaten American, Israeli, and other nations' interests.

The Iranian government's adherence to Islamic law, and its anti-Western philosophy, inspire many Islamic extremists. Iran is also one of the principal state sponsors of terror. For example, weapons delivered from Tehran via Damascus to Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon have allowed them to stockpile at least 10,000 Katyusha rockets with the capability of hitting major Israeli population centers. When Israel seized the Karine-A ship in 2002, it was loaded with more than 50 tons of Iranian arms bound for the Palestinian Authority.

Iran has been implicated in numerous anti-West and anti-Israel terrorist attacks. Some of these incidents include the taking of more than 30 Western hostages in Lebanon from 1984 through 1992, the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the French-U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the Buenos Aires terrorist attacks on the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and on the Argentine Jewish communal building in 1994. Iran also provides at least transit and temporary safe haven to members of al-Qaida.

A nuclear Iran would change the entire strategic balance in the Middle East. Officials in Tehran have repeatedly said Iran will never scrap its nuclear program, and talks with the Europeans are aimed at protecting the country's nuclear achievements, not negotiating an end to them.

The difficult question is what to do to preempt the Iranians. Military action is an option, but does not have wide support in the administration or abroad. Imposing trade and other sanctions is feasible, but many European nations are loathe to jeopardize their profitable economic ties to Iran, and Saddam proved sanctions are not necessarily an impediment to continuing weapons programs. Stricter IAEA monitoring is also an option, but Iraq, Iran, and North Korea all proved the IAEA is incapable of preventing secret weapons development, and may make matters worse by creating a sense of false security about the program they are monitoring.

Courtesy of: Dr. Mitchell G. Bard, American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise


The Israel Project authorizes and welcomes use of any part or all of this release/statement free of charge and without attribution.
print