



Negotiated Peace: The Win-Win Solution



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About TIP

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Our team of trusted multi-lingual experts and former reporters provides journalists and leaders with fact sheets, backgrounders and sources. TIP regularly hosts press briefings featuring leading Israeli spokespeople and analysts who give journalists an opportunity to get face-to-face information and answers to their questions. By ensuring journalists have the facts, context and visuals they need, TIP causes hundreds of millions of people around the world to see a more positive public face of Israel. This helps protect Israel, reduce anti-Semitism and increase pride in Israel.

The Jerusalem Office

The Israel Project's Jerusalem Office is a non-governmental resource that works with foreign journalists and leaders based in Israel, providing them facts and information before they file their stories/reports. TIP's Jerusalem team features former journalists and Middle East experts fluent in English, Hebrew, Arabic, French, German, Farsi and Russian.

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Lasting Peace Requires Mutual Recognition

Israel supports the notion of a two-state solution achieved through direct negotiations. As a result, it opposes any Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). Such a declaration would damage prospects for peace by bypassing negotiations and failing to resolve contentious issues. By providing unilateral recognition, other nations are giving the Palestinians a way out of mutual talks and dialogue, Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Yigal Palmor said. *“By making this unilateral recognition they are actually encouraging the Palestinians not to return to the negotiating table¹,”* he said.

Even Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Salam Fayyad admits that unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state is not the best way forward for the Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority is not pursuing a unilateral declaration of independence because a true Palestinian state requires Israeli acceptance and recognition, said Fayyad.²

U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) established a framework for achieving a viable peace agreement.³

Direct Talks Are Key to Peace



Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reiterated his desire to pursue one-to-one talks with PA leader Mahmoud Abbas until a peace agreement is reached.

“I am prepared to immediately sit privately for direct, continuous negotiations with [Mahmoud Abbas] until white smoke emerges. If [Abbas] will agree to my suggestion to directly discuss all the core issues, we will know very quickly if it is possible to reach an agreement,” said Netanyahu.⁴

Palestinians abandoned direct talks with Israel in September 2010, after a 10-month Israeli settlement moratorium expired. Abbas blamed Israel’s West Bank housing policy for the breakdown in talks. Israel says construction should be addressed in direct talks. The United States is now trying to use indirect negotiations, but the Palestinians are resisting.

¹ Castillo, Mariano, “Latin American countries line up behind Palestinian state,” *CNN*, Jan. 8, 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/01/04/latin.america.palestinian.state/index.html?iref=allsearch>

² “Palestinian PM says not seeking UDI,” *Yahoo! News*, Dec. 18, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20101218/wl_mideast_afp/israelpalestinianspeace

³ Baker, Alan, “Recognition of a Palestinian State – Premature, Legally Invalid, and Undermining any Bona Fide Negotiation Process,” Vol. 10, No. 13, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Dec. 9, 2010, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=582&PID=2225&IID=5441&TTL=Recognition_of_a_Palestinian_State_%E2%80%93_Premature,_Legally_Invalid,_and_Undermining_any_Bona_F

⁴ Friedman, Matti, “Netanyahu wants nonstop talks with Palestinians,” *MSNBC*, Jan. 2, 2011, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40877624/ns/world_news-mideastn_africa/

Abbas said a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians could be signed within two months if Netanyahu showed “goodwill.”⁵ Netanyahu said he would see a peace agreement through to the end if the PA agrees to a demilitarized Palestinian state that recognizes Israel as a legitimate Jewish state.⁶

Israel’s security is paramount, in particular with continued Iran-backed Hamas attacks on Israeli civilians. Unilateralism plays into the hands of Hamas. It weakens the voice of the majority on both sides who favor concessions for peace. It further intensifies the danger of violence and the culture of hatred.

2010-2011 Main Negotiating Points between Israel and the Palestinian Authority

- **Recognition of Israel as a Jewish State**
The PA and its leaders still haven’t recognized Israel as a Jewish state. Doing so would serve as an important confidence-building measure, as would the end of the culture of hate toward Israel that is promoted in the West Bank and Gaza.
- **Security and final borders**
Israel is calling for the demilitarization of a future Palestinian state as well as the deployment of the Israel Defense Forces in the Jordan Valley to prevent weapons smuggling into the West Bank.⁷ PA President Mahmoud Abbas has called for a return to pre-1967 borders as preconditions for talks.⁸
- **Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements in the West Bank**
The PA insists Israel halt all construction in some Jerusalem suburbs and the West Bank.⁹ Israel says the future of these communities should be discussed as one of the elements of a final-status agreement.¹⁰
- **Resolution of Palestinian refugee issues**
The Palestinians continue to demand that all members of the Palestinian diaspora should be able to resettle in Israel. The Israeli position is that those who wish to should seek their future in the proposed Palestinian state.¹¹
- **Access to crucial resources including water**
Both sides suffer from the regional water scarcity and must work together to provide mutually-fair access to all sources including desalination plants on the Mediterranean coast, the Sea of Galilee in northern Israel and aquifers in the West Bank.¹²

⁵ Keinon, Herb, “PM to Abbas: Ready to talk until ‘white smoke comes out’”, *JPost*, Jan. 2, 2011, <http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=201891>

⁶ Interview with the Prime Minister, Prime Minister’s Office, Dec. 27, 2010, <http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMO/Communication/interviews/interviewten271210.htm> (accessed Jan. 13, 2011)

⁷ Benn, Aluf, “Netanyahu must be a latter-day Gorbachev,” *Haaretz*, Aug. 27, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/magazine/week-s-end/netanyahu-may-be-a-latter-day-gorbachev-1.310509>

⁸ Koutsoukis, Jason, “Israel, Palestinians set to agree to peace talks,” *The Sydney morning Herald*, Aug. 21, 2010, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/israel-palestinians-set-to-agree-to-peace-talks-20100820-138xd.html>

⁹ Waked, Ali, “Abbas: Obama knows West Bank building will ruin talks,” *YnetNews*, Aug. 30, 2010, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3945664,00.html>

¹⁰ Ravid, Barak, “Netanyahu: I never promised to extend West Bank settlement construction freeze,” *Haaretz*, Aug. 30, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/netanyahu-i-never-promised-to-extend-west-bank-settlement-construction-freeze-1.310937>

¹¹ “Refugees,” Anti-Defamation League Web site, accessed Aug. 20, 2010, http://www.adl.org/israel/final_status/refugees_3.asp

¹² Dinar, Shlomi, “Is Water a Key to Middle East Peace?”, *inFocus Quarterly*, Vol II, No. 3, Fall 2008, <http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/329/is-water-a-key-to-middle-east-peace>

Expert opinions:

"Although a unilateral Palestinian declaration of statehood is a seemingly attractive alternative to negotiations and is gaining credence among a growing group of countries, it is an almost surefire recipe for war. If the Palestinian government unilaterally claims land where an estimated 400,000 Israeli settlers currently reside in the West Bank, don't expect them simply to pull up and move, especially if they were not consulted on the matter. Expect them to fight," writes Jonathan Schanzer, Middle East expert and vice president at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.¹³



Jonathan Schanzer

"From there, a border dispute with Israel becomes inevitable," Schanzer adds.

"To recognize the existence of a Palestinian state in the current circumstance is to reinvent international law. If the Palestinians qualify as a state, so might many of the separatist movements of Europe and the rest of the world. Actually, such a decision could come back to bite the Europeans in the future," David Benjamin, international law consultant and former military legal adviser to the Israel Defense Forces, told The Israel Project.

These acts of recognition are violations of United Nations Security Resolution 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), which are internationally accepted and internationally sponsored.



Alan Baker, former legal advisor
to the Israeli Foreign Ministry

"This factor was perhaps amplified following a Palestinian attempt to declare statehood in 1988, when over 100 states gave their recognition. But clearly, this unilateral Palestinian attempt to dictate a solution to the Israel-Palestinian issue outside the internationally accepted and sponsored peace negotiation process established by the UN Security Council in Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) was never seen to be a serious factor in solving the issue," said Alan Baker, international law expert at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.¹⁴

Resolution 242, in particular, states that borders can be agreed upon by free consent between two interested states. "*We keep constantly in mind that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has necessarily to be based on secure permanent boundaries freely **agreed upon and negotiated by the neighboring States,***" it says.

¹³ Schanzer, Jonathan, "A Palestinian State Means War," *Foreign Policy*, Dec. 9, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/12/09/a_palestinian_state_means_war

¹⁴ Baker, Alan, "Recognition of a Palestinian State – Premature, Legally Invalid, and Undermining any Bona Fide Negotiation Process," Vol. 10, No. 13, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Dec. 9, 2010, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DRIT=1&DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=582&PID=2225&IID=5441&TTL=Recognition_of_a_Palestinian_State_%E2%80%93_Premature,_Legally_Invalid,_and_Undermining_any_Bona_F

Palestinians Push for Unilateral Declaration of Statehood

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has embarked on a campaign to seek international support for a unilateral declaration of independence of a Palestinian state. The Palestinian leadership is aiming to bring the idea to the United Nations (UN) in September. The implications are very serious for the entire Middle East peace process.

According to the Palestinian plans, it would mean;

- a) borders based on the 1949 armistice demarcation lines (often referred to as “the 1967 borders”) without territory swaps (something both sides have accepted are needed in previous negotiations)
- b) affirmation of the “right of return” for the Arab 1948 refugees and their descendants, which would both swamp Israel demographically and not take into account the “right of return” for the approximate same number of Jewish refugees who were pushed out of Arab countries
- c) no arrangements that would help provide Israel with security against attack from the areas of withdrawal (a presence along the Jordan river, demilitarization of the Palestinian state)

Since the UN General Assembly can only make recommendations, rather than imposing a mandate, it is likely that supporters of the PA will bring their proposal to the UN Security Council, which has the power to mandate the result they seek.

Should the Palestinians go the unilateral statehood route, a majority in the General Assembly seems guaranteed, and recognition by the Security Council – whose decisions are legally binding, unlike the GA – could face an American veto. Thus, the recognition drive at the UN will not necessarily bring about a Palestinian state. This step would widen the gap between Israelis and Palestinians, hamper negotiations and make a negotiated peace almost impossible.

In assessing the Palestinian’s Plan B, governments around the world should keep the following facts in mind:

- A unilateral declaration of independence violates the prevailing Oslo Accords. It would relieve Israel of all obligations towards the Palestinians and have unpredictable consequences for the economy, freedom of movement and other areas such as water and electricity supply to the Palestinians
- In the 18 years since the Oslo Accords, Palestinians have never made a settlement freeze a precondition to negotiations. Abbas himself negotiated with seven previous Israeli Prime Ministers without such a demand
- Abbas’ refusal to meet with Israel is a direct violation of a pledge he himself made at the Annapolis conference in November 2007: “We agree to immediately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty, resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements. We agree to engage in vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations.”
- Abbas is also rejecting the imperative laid down by the Quartet in March 2010, demanding “the resumption, without preconditions, of direct, bilateral negotiations that resolve all final status issues as previously agreed by the parties.”

Lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians can only come through negotiations that settle all issues. Unilateral steps will not work and could do harm, mostly to the Palestinian goal of their own state existing alongside Israel in peace and security – a goal shared by Israel.

Palestinian Statehood – A Background to the Situation Today

Yasser Arafat, then-leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, declared a Palestinian state in November 1988. The U. N. Security Council and 93 governments supported the move. Yet, the state never came into existence because the recognition proved meaningless; negotiations remain the preferred method to reach Palestinian statehood.¹⁵

A Palestinian state will be established after the completion of a "*Permanent Status Agreement*"¹⁶ which determines the Palestinian right to self-determination and recognizes the "*mutual legitimate and political rights*" of both the Palestinians and Israelis.¹⁷

The aim is to "*achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process,*" according to the Oslo Accords.¹⁸

The process includes a finality of claims on issues including "*permanent borders, settlements, Jerusalem, resolution of the refugee issue, and security arrangements,*" an end of conflict and end of occupation as defined by international law, as well as establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.¹⁹

The Palestinian entity is not a sovereign state because it has not fulfilled the criteria for statehood, particularly within the framework of the road map.²⁰

Excerpts from U.S. House Resolution 1765 Backing Direct Talks

"Whereas a true and lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians can only be achieved through direct negotiations between the parties;"

"Whereas, on March 11, 1999, the Senate adopted Senate Concurrent Resolution 5, and on March 16, 1999, the House of Representatives adopted House Concurrent Resolution 24, both of which resolved that "any attempt to establish Palestinian statehood outside the negotiating process will invoke the strongest congressional opposition";"

"Whereas, on November 5, 2010, United States Department of State Spokesman Mark Toner, responding to a question about the Palestinians possibly taking action to seek recognition of a Palestinian state at the United Nations, said, "[T]he only way that we're going to get a comprehensive peace is through direct negotiations, and anything that might affect those direct negotiations we feel is not helpful and not constructive";"

"Whereas efforts to bypass negotiations and to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state, or to appeal to the United Nations or other international forums or to foreign governments for recognition of a Palestinian state, would violate the underlying principles of the Oslo Accords, the Road Map, and other relevant Middle East peace process efforts."

¹⁵ Diehl, Jackson, "Can the United Nations create a Palestinian state?," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 26, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/postpartisan/2010/10/post_8.html

¹⁶ "Unilateral Recognition", *The Reut Institute*, July 22, 2004, <http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=409>

¹⁷ "The Oslo Declaration of Principles, September 13, 1993", MidEast Web, <http://www.mideastweb.org/meoslodop.htm>

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ "Permanent Status Agreement", *The Reut Institute*, Apr. 11, 2005, <http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=404>

²⁰ "Status of Palestinian Statehood", *The Reut Institute*, Aug. 2, 2005, <http://www.reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=379>

European Union Members Prefer Peace Talks

Palestinian lobbyists attempting to garner support for their plan of unilaterally declaring a Palestinian state are faced with members of the European Union standing firm in disagreement.

During a visit to Jordan in January, 2011, Alistair Burt, minister for the Middle East, declared that the United Kingdom (UK) would not recognize a unilaterally declared Palestinian state. "We cannot recognize a state that does not have a capital, and doesn't have borders," Burt said.²¹

The European Union (EU) released a statement deciding not to recognize a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state, as such a move could harm efforts to resume the Middle East peace process.²² "We want to see the State of Israel and a sovereign, independent, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine living side by side in peace and security," said a council of 27 EU foreign ministers, headed by foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton.

Jordan Does Not Favor Unilateralism

Jordan's Support for Negotiations



"The region is in a critical stage and great effort will be needed to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the two-state solution. The opportunity cannot be missed for the sake of future generations."²³

- King Abdullah II of Jordan

"His majesty reiterated Jordan's firm, unwavering commitment to exert every effort to ensure the success of these negotiations and their fruitful conclusion with an agreed upon timeframe and the realization of the two-state solution whereupon independent, sovereign, territorially contiguous Palestinian state living side by side in security, peace, good neighborly relations, cooperation and integration with Israel and the other countries of the region within a regional context that also leads to the achievement of comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on the basis of internationally agreed upon terms of reference for Middle East peace and particularly the Arab Peace Initiative."²⁴

- Remarks by Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh

²¹ Parr, Nora, "UK will consider UN resolution, but talks remain goal" *Ma'an News Agency*, Jan. 20, 2011, <http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=352604>

²² "EU to wait until 'appropriate' to recognize Palestinian state," *HaAretz*, Dec. 13, 2010, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/eu-to-wait-until-appropriate-to-recognize-palestinian-state-1.330440>

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ "Remarks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh," Consulate General of the United States, Sep. 16, 2010, <http://jerusalem.usconsulate.gov/remarks0916100.html>

Palestinian Leaders' Support for Negotiations

A survey of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip showed that a 66 percent majority of Palestinians support peace negotiations, with an even larger majority favoring direct talks, according to a report released by the Arab World for Research and Development (AWRAD).²⁵

"We've come a long way in negotiations. 75% of Palestinians support a two state solution and we want to make peace with all of Israel. It is not about putting everyone to their sides, we are destined to live together."²⁶

- **Chief PLO negotiator Saeb Erekat**, December 2010

"Formulate a peace plan that is consistent with the international resolutions."²⁷

- **Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas**

Salam Fayyad has said a unilateral declaration of independence by his people would only lead to a *"Mickey Mouse state... we're not looking for yet another declaration of statehood."^{28 29}*

Peace Negotiations: the Key Points Since 2000

FORMER PRIME MINISTER EHUD OLMERT'S COMMENTS ON GENEVA INITIATIVE CONFERENCE (SEPTEMBER 2010)

A solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be based on 1967 borders with Jerusalem managed by international trustees including Israel and a Palestinian state. The refugee issue should be resolved in the framework on the Arab Peace Initiative, and with reference to the Road Map.

"EIGHT-POINT DOCUMENT" (2007)³⁰

This document outlines eight points agreed upon by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government. It called for "Palestine to be declared a national homeland for the Palestinian people and Israel to be declared a national homeland for the Jewish people." Israel would withdraw and destroy its Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria in stages to establish an "unarmed Palestinian state within the 1967 borders." Jerusalem would be divided into two capitals and Israel would relinquish sovereignty to a committee to oversee Old City and holy sites. The document also dealt with finding a just solution for the Palestinian refugee problem.

²⁵ Omer-man, Michael, "Survey: 66% of Palestinians support peace negotiations," JPost, Dec. 11, 2010, <http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=195040>

²⁶ Hodes, Stephanie, "Erekat: Boycott Settlements, not Israel," JPost, Dec. 30, 2010, <http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?id=201628>

²⁷ "Palestinian leader wants new plan for peace talks," Fox News, Dec. 31, 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/12/31/palestinian-leader-wants-backing-proposal/#ixzz19sAjWVMz>

²⁸ "Palestinian PM says not seeking UDI," Yahoo! News, Dec. 18, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20101218/wl_mideast_afp/israelpalestinianspeace/print

²⁹ Salam Fayyad interview with Dana Weiss, Channel 2, Dec. 15, 2010, <http://www.mako.co.il/news-channel2/Channel-2-News/Article-efd74bc361bec21004.htm>

³⁰ "PA Leaks 8-Point Agreement Made With Olmert," Arutz Sheva, Sep. 17, 2007, <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/Flash.aspx/133157>

ANNAPOLIS AGREEMENT (NOVEMBER 2007)³¹

The Annapolis Conference marked the first time Israel and Palestine entered a conference with a common understanding that a two-state solution is the outline for addressing the conflict. The goal is for Israel and Palestine to be two states, living side by side in peace and security. It called to end bloodshed, suffering and decades of conflict. The agreement confronted terrorism, incitement, and propagated a culture of peace and nonviolence.

ROAD MAP TO PEACE (APRIL 2003)³²

The principles of the plan were first outlined by U.S. president George W. Bush in a speech on June 4, 2002 to achieve the vision of two states living side by side in peace. The plan was split into three phases:

Phase I (as early as May 2003):

- End Palestinian violence and reform the Palestinian political system in preparation for statehood
- Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian areas occupied from September 2000, and freeze settlement expansion

Phase II (as early as June-Dec 2003):

- International Conference, convened by the Quartet, to support Palestinian economic recovery
- Launch a process leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders
- Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues
- Arab states to restore pre-Intifada links to Israel
- Promotion by Quartet of international recognition of Palestine, including possible UN membership

Phase III (as early as 2004-2005):

- Second international conference
- Permanent status agreement and end of conflict
- Agreement on final borders
- Clarification of the fate of Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements
- Arab states to agree to peace deals with Israel

ARAB PEACE INITIATIVE (2002, re-endorsed 2007)³³

- Complete withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the 4 June 1967 line and the territories still occupied in southern Lebanon
- Attain a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees to be agreed upon in accordance with the UN General Assembly Resolution No 194
- Accept the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since 4 June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital
- In return, the Arab states will consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over, sign a peace agreement with Israel and establish normal relations with Israel within the framework of this comprehensive peace

³¹ "Annapolis agreement: full text," *Guardian*, Nov. 27, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/nov/27/israel.usa1>

³² "Bush Says He Will Help Israelis, Palestinians Work Toward Peace," *Global Security*, April 30, 2003, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2003/04/mil-030430-usia02.htm>

³³ "The Arab Peace Initiative, March 28, 2002," MidEast Web, <http://www.mideastweb.org/saudipeace.htm> (accessed Jan. 13, 2011)

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT 2000³⁴

Territory

Palestinian position;

- Demanded return to 1967 Green Line borders, immediate withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

Israeli position;

- Palestinian state on 73% of the West Bank, and 100% of the Gaza Strip. In 10-25 years, the Palestinian state would expand to 90-91% of the West Bank (94% excluding greater Jerusalem)
- Israel would have to withdraw from 63 settlements, keeping only those close to the Green Line, with the exception of Kiryat Arba (to be an Israeli enclave, linked by a bypass road)
- 1% of the Negev to be ceded to the Palestinians
- Israel recognised the need for a contiguous Palestinian state, proposed that the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be linked by an elevated highway and elevated railroad, running through the Negev

Jerusalem and the Temple Mount

Palestinian position;

- All of East Jerusalem should be returned to Palestinian sovereignty with the Jewish Quarter and Western Wall placed under Israeli authority, not sovereignty. Jerusalem to be an open city with cooperation on municipal services.

Israeli position;

- Palestinians would be granted “custodianship”, not sovereignty, on the Temple Mount, with Israel retaining sovereignty over the Western Wall. The Jewish Quarter will remain in Israeli hands. Palestinians would be granted the rest of the Old City and control of Islamic and Christian holy sites.
- Settlements beyond the Green Line such as Ma’ale Adumim, Givat Ze’ev and Gush Etzion would be annexed to Jerusalem, while the Palestinians would be given sovereignty over villages and cities such as Abu Dis, Alezariya, and eastern Sawahre.
- East Jerusalem would be run by Palestinian civilian administration, with the possibility of merging it to Israeli East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem.

Refugees and the right of return

Palestinian position;

- Refugees from Israel’s first defensive war against Arab countries, comprising some four million (about half of the Palestinian people) should be given full right of return, including the restoration of property or compensatory payment.

Israeli position;

- A maximum of 100,000 refugees would be allowed to return to Israel, on the basis of humanitarian considerations or family reunification.
- All other people classified as Palestinian refugees would be settled in their present place of inhabitation, the Palestinian state, or third-party countries.
- Israel would fund their resettlement and absorption, contributing a total of \$30 billion.

Israeli security concerns

- Israel would be allowed to set up early warning stations inside the Palestinian state.
- Israel would be able to use airspace, and have the right to deploy troops on Palestinian territory in the event of an emergency.
- An international force would be stationed in the Jordan Valley.

³⁴ “The Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David-July 2000”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 11, 2000, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern%20History/Historic%20Events/The%20Middle%20East%20Peace%20Summit%20at%20Camp%20David-%20July%20202> (accessed Jan. 13, 2011)

- Palestinian authorities would maintain control of border crossings, under temporary Israeli observation.
- Israel demanded that the Palestinian state be demilitarized with the exception of its paramilitary security forces, that it would not make alliances without Israeli approval or allow the introduction of foreign forces east of the Jordan River, and that it dismantle terrorist groups.

Israeli-Palestinian Security Cooperation: A Success Story

A relatively unheralded success that Israel and the Palestinian Authority share is their cooperation on security and counter-terrorism by their respective defense services. Lives have been saved and outbreaks of violence diminished as the two entities have worked together to protect Israelis and Palestinians from harm. Cooperation and capabilities have increased since the rapprochement that came after the Second Intifada ended. The success of this relationship can be cited as an example of the mutually beneficial relationship possible if Israel and the PA continue to work together toward peace.

Beginning of the Relationship

Security arrangements made up a significant portion of the early agreements between the Israeli government and the Yasser Arafat-led Palestine Liberation Organization. The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of September 1995 stated: "The Palestinian police force established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement will be fully integrated into the Palestinian Police and will be subject to the provisions of this Agreement. Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip."³⁵

From there the relationship between the security services of Israel and the Palestinian Authority began. Former PLO militiamen were integrated into the new paramilitary police forces of the PA. The arrangement created a broad mandate for cooperation, declaring the two sides would "cooperate in combating criminal activity which may affect both sides, including offenses related to trafficking in illegal drugs and psychotropic substances, smuggling, and offenses against property."³⁶

A very early success was seen in Hebron after the signing of the Hebron Agreement in January of 1997 by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for Israel and Yasser Arafat for the PA. By the agreement, Israel withdrew from 80 percent of the city and much of the surrounding area, turning it over to the PA. A significant amount of security arrangements were made, most importantly perhaps being the protection of Jewish holy sites by Palestinian police officers.³⁷ It was an unprecedented success in terms of security cooperation. Until the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000, Hebron saw few major security incidents.

The next step in cementing the Israeli-Palestinian security relationship was October 1998's Wye River Memorandum, again signed by Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Arafat. Designed to facilitate the implementation of past agreements (such as Oslo) and pave the way for final status negotiations, the Memorandum had significant amounts of provisions on security, specifically on security cooperation.³⁸

³⁵ "The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." *The Jewish Virtual Library*, <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interim.html> (accessed Mar. 27, 2011)

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ "The Hebron Agreement, 1997," *Palestine Facts*, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1991to_now_hebron_agreement_1997.php (accessed Mar. 27, 2011)

³⁸ Aaronson, Geoffrey, "The Wye River Memorandum and Israeli Settlements." *The Jerusalem Fund*, Aug. 4, 1999, <http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/pubs/19990804ib.html>

The two sides agreed to continuous and comprehensive bilateral cooperation, including an exchange of forensic expertise, training, and other assistance and the establishment of a trilateral high-ranking U.S.-Palestinian-Israeli committee that would meet no less than biweekly to assess threats and resolve impediments to effective security coordination. It also took steps to combat terror and terrorist organizations.³⁹ However, the majority of the Memorandum's goals and understandings remain unimplemented, mostly due to the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000.

The Second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, saw a complete breakdown in the relationship between Israeli and Palestinian security services and in some clashes, Palestinian policemen faced off against the IDF. U.S. efforts to reconcile the two sides started paying off in 2005 in the run-up to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip, and by the end of the year the U.N. was commending them for their cooperation.⁴⁰ By 2007, there was renewed security coordination and representatives of the IDF and Israeli security services met with their Palestinian counterparts.⁴¹ Yuval Diskin, then head of Shin Bet, stated that he believed the two sides had "established a very good working relationship."⁴²

Post-Intifada Successes

Coordination and cooperation have increased since then, especially since the U.S. and EU started taking a more active role in training the Palestinian security services. Their efforts have created a motivated and highly effective security apparatus, one that has proven to be a valuable ally to Israel. Recent events have only affirmed this.

"Coordination is better ... there is an improvement," said Palestinian Gen. Radi Assidi in an interview with the *Christian Science Monitor*. Assidi also referred to Israeli army officers responsible for the Jenin region as "my counterparts."⁴³ A high level of professionalism exists between the security services. Responding to allegations that the Palestinian security services are tools of an Israeli occupation, PA Interior Minister Said Abu Ali enthusiastically stated that, "The security apparatus don't work to serve or perpetuate the occupation... They are part of the Palestinian institutions that represent our national aspiration to end the occupation and found the Palestinian state."⁴⁴

A report from March 2011 stated that "686 meetings were held between Israeli and PA commanders in 2010, an increase of 26 percent from the previous year."⁴⁵ Cooperation is not just limited to terrorism, but basic law enforcement jobs, such as forgery, drugs, and even traffic regulations. Israeli and PA police were also said to have markedly increased their cooperation over the last year, with seminars on forensics, antiquity theft, car theft and community police operations.⁴⁶

A report by the Israeli Coordinator for Activities in the Territories stated that "Security coordination between Israel and the PA was broadened and the activities of the Palestinian security organizations in

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ "Security Council Presidential Statement Welcomes Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Rafah Crossing as "Important Step Forward," *The United Nations Information Service*, Dec. 1, 2005, <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/sc8565.html> (accessed March 27, 2011).

⁴¹ Waked, Ali, "Joint Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation." *YNet New*, Mar. 29, 2007, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3382599,00.html>

⁴² "WikiLeaks hints at Israeli-Palestinian cooperation," *Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review*, Dec. 21, 2010, <http://www.hurriyetaidailynews.com/n.php?n=wikileaks-hints-at-israeli-palestinian-cooperation-2010-12-21>

⁴³ Mitnick, Joshua, "From intifada hub to model Palestinian city: How Jenin turned around," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 5, 2010, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0805/From-intifada-hub-to-model-Palestinian-city-How-Jenin-turned-around>

⁴⁴ Daraghmeh, Mohammed and Hubbard, Ben, "Israeli-Palestinian security coordinated," *The Washington Times*, Dec. 7, 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/7/israeli-palestinian-security-coordinated/?page=1>

⁴⁵ "Report: Palestinians stepping up cooperation," *The World Tribune*, Mar. 16, 2011, http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2011/me_israel0294_03_16.asp

⁴⁶ Ibid.

Judea and Samaria were expanded, leading to improved overall security and to an improved sense of security among Palestinians in Judea and Samaria.⁴⁷ It is important to note that this opinion was expressed after the murder of five members of the Fogel family in the settlement of Itamar in the West Bank this March.

Security coordination continues to be an area where Israel and the PA cooperate effectively and relatively amicably. Despite some recent disturbances, the relationship remains important, effectual, and an example for the two sides to follow in areas outside of security. It is a promising basis for Israel and the PA to build on and proves their ability to work together, furthering the path to two states living in peace.

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⁴⁷ Ibid.