



Six-Day War 40th Anniversary Guide

Note: We recommend printing out this document for ease of use



Distances Between Israeli Population Centers and Pre-1967 Armistice Lines



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Summary

THE SIX-DAY WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

The 40th anniversary of the Six-Day War (June 5 -10, 1967), which pitted the Israeli Defense Forces against the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, is primarily a time for Israelis to remember and honor the lives lost, and the painful sacrifices made, to ensure that peace would one day exist between the Jewish State and her Arab neighbors.

Israel's stunning military and territorial victory in June 1967 only resulted in diplomatic triumphs several years later. Although Israel did not enter the war with ambitions for territorial expansion, the fighting did result in its acquisition of lands previously controlled by Egypt, Jordan and Syria, some of which would later be returned to them in future peace agreements

Following the war, the Arab States initially refused to recognize, negotiate or make peace with Israel. It took another decade for Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to agree to a land-for-peace deal in which Israel returned every bit of the Sinai it had taken during the war, in the process ceding control of valuable oil fields and painfully relocating thousands of Israelis from the community of Yamit. Since then, for more than 28 years, Egypt and Israel have lived side-by-side in peace.

In 1994, Jordan finally agreed to a peace deal in which Israel returned land in the Negev border area it had held since 1967. Israel and Jordan now enjoy educational exchanges, political dialogue and economic trade.

Since the Six-Day War, even after subsequent wars over the years, Israel has been unable to achieve a lasting peace agreement with Syria or with the Palestinians

In 1998 and 2000, Israeli and Syrian negotiators met to negotiate a peace agreement. Despite Israel's willingness to cede almost all of the Golan Heights and relocate all of the Israelis who live there, Syria rejected this generous offer, refusing to agree to a full normalization of relations with Israel.

For decades Syria has perpetrated attacks against Israeli civilians through its sponsorship of terrorist groups such as Hamas, Hizbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Syria also works closely with Iran – the world's chief state-sponsor of terror and whose president has called for Israel to be wiped off the map – to rearm terrorist groups in the region, whose principle goal is the destruction of Israel.

In 1993, Israeli signed the Oslo Accords with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, granting Palestinians in the West and Gaza a degree of self-rule they had never known under Jordanian and Egyptian rule. Israeli forces subsequently withdraw from almost all Palestinian population areas in the West Bank, placing them under full control of the Palestinian Authority.

In 2005, Israel withdraw completely withdrew all its forces from the Gaza Strip and evacuated over 9,000 civilian residents beyond the 1967 border, a painful and risky sacrifice that it hoped would lead to a future final peace agreement with Palestinians.

Instead, almost immediately afterwards, Palestinian terrorist groups began using Gaza to stockpile weapons, fire rockets into Israel and openly set up terrorist training camps. More than 1,300 Qassam rockets have been launched by Palestinian militants across the 1967 border into Israel, killing 10 Israelis. The Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (P.A.) has done nothing to stop the attacks, and members of its armed forces are directly involved in their planning and execution.

Today, the only Israeli found within the Gaza Strip is Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier kidnapped by Palestinian terror groups in a cross-border attack on June 29, 2006.

“Along with opportunities for peace, the June [1967] war opened the door to even deadlier conflagrations,” writes historian Michael Oren. Despite of the violence and bloodshed that continues today, the government of Israel is still committed to one day living peacefully and securely side-by-side with the Syrians, and alongside an independent and democratic Palestinian State, hoping its Arab neighbor will take those opportunities of peace, instead of continuing the legacy of war.

Reference List

Websites

- A UK-based site specializing in documenting the personal history of the Six-day war: <http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk>
- The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs background on the Six-Day War providing in-depth documentation and descriptions of events and speeches: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/THE+SIX-DAY+WAR+-+INTRODUCTION.htm> (<http://www.mfa.gov.il>)
- For documents and information related to U.S. diplomacy and foreign relations during the Arab-Israeli conflict 1964-1968, please see the U.S. Department of State's related site published by its Office of the Historian: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/>
- For background on why Israel entered the West Bank: *Beyond Images*, <http://www.beyondimages.info/b103.html>
- For the *Jewish Virtual Library's* detailed background on the Six-Day War and maps: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/67_War.html
- For the original text of United Nations and conference resolutions mentioned in this document: Yale Law School's *Avalon Project*, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/mideast.htm#1960>

Books

- Michael Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of Modern Middle East*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002

[For the summary of a speech given by Oren about the Six-Day War:
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2080>]

- Abba Eban, [Abba Eban: An Autobiography](#). Random House. ISBN 0-394-49302-8

Timeline of Events Leading up to and through The Six-Day War 1956-1968

1956-1967: Following the Sinai War, Arab unrest spreads across the region, while anti-Israeli activity begins to develop across the Syrian and Jordanian borders. The Syrians regularly shell Israel from the Golan Heights, attacking fishing boats on the Sea of Galilee, shelling villages and agricultural workers in a demilitarized zone in the Hulah valley.

1957: Israel withdraws from Sinai and Gaza in March. A United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) moves in.

1960: Egypt notifies the United Nations forces in the Gaza Strip that a war with Israel is possible. They amass forces in Sinai, but retreat two months later without any action taken. The Egyptian army and greater Arab world claim they have deterred a massive Israeli attack on Syria.

1964: The PLO is officially formed and recognized at the Arab Summit Conference. The PLO immediately begins launching terrorist raids against Israel.

1966: Syria sends saboteurs via Jordan and Lebanon to carry out terrorist raids, thus provoking Israeli attacks on the villages around Hebron where many of the terrorists were based.

1966: On November 11, three Israeli soldiers are killed by a mine planted by the PLO's Fatah organization. On November 13, before a letter sent by King Hussein of Jordan condemning Fatah's terrorist act on the 11th, reached the Israeli government, Israel launched a retaliatory raid, killing 15 Jordanian soldiers.¹

1967:

22 February: Syria announces it is time to move from "...defensive positions to offensive positions..."²

7 April: Syria steps up its shelling, increasing attacks on border villages, leading to an air fight between the Syrians and the Israeli Air Force (IAF).

12-13 May: A Russian report alleges that Israel is amassing troops along the Syrian border. Israel denies the build-up. U.N. Secretary General U Thant reports that UNTSO observers on the Syrian border "... have verified the absence of troop concentrations and absence of noteworthy military movements on both sides of the [Syrian] line."³ According to the Soviet media, the Russian accusations were part of a coordinated "Zionist-imperialist" plot to undermine the revolutionary regimes in the Middle East.⁴ Today it is understood that this Soviet report, used to deliberately incite Egypt and Syria to form an active military alliance against Israel, was in fact, false.⁵

14-15 May: Syria requests Egypt act to deter an Israeli attack, invoking a mutual defense treaty. Egyptian Field Marshal, Abd al-Hakim Amer orders the Egyptian Army in Sinai "*To raise the level*

1 Oren, Michael, "The Six-Day War and it's Enduring Legacy," The Washington Institute, July 2, 2002, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2080>

2 Draper, Theodore, Israel and World Politics: Roots of the third Arab-Israeli War, Secker and Warburg, 1968

3 "Israel 1948-1967, Six-Day War Background," Palestinefacts.org, http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_1948to1967_sixday_backgd.php

4 <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue2/jv9no2a4.html>

5 Oren, Michael, "The Six-Day War and it's Enduring Legacy," The Washington Institute, July 2, 2002, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2080>

of preparedness to a full alert for war, beginning 14.30, 14 May 1967.⁶ At the same time Israel clarifies that it does not have aggressive intentions against Egypt or any other Arab state.⁷

18-19 May: Egypt requests that U.N. forces withdraw. U.N. Secretary General, U Thant orders a complete withdrawal of U.N. forces without consulting the U.N. General Assembly or Security Council

20 May: Egypt dispatches at least 100,000 troops to Israel's southwestern border, leading to a sweep in Arab nationalism against Israel


22 May: Egypt closes the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, and any international assistance promised to Israel in case of such a violation in the region never materializes.⁸ Arab troops continued to gather on Israel's borders, reaching estimated levels of 450,000 or more.

26-27 May: Israel learns of an Egyptian and Syrian plan to launch a war of annihilation against Israel within the next 48 hours. The initial Egyptian military offensive, dubbed "The Dawn," was essentially a march straight to Jordan, cutting Israel in half and planned by Egyptian general, Abdul Hakim Amer. Only minutes before the attack was intended to begin, pressure by the United States and the Soviets, convinced President Nasser to call it off.⁹

30 May: Egypt, Syria and Jordan sign a mutual defense pack, solidifying their alliance and putting Jordan's military under Egyptian command.

4 June: Egyptian troops in the Sinai now include seven divisions (four infantry, two armored and one mechanized), plus four independent infantry and four independent armored brigades. These forces are equipped with 950 tanks, 1,100 APCs and more than 1,000 artillery pieces.¹⁰

2 June: Moshe Dayan, a former chief of staff known for his trademark eye patch, joins the Israeli cabinet as Minister of Defense.



[For a more detailed look at the six days of war, please see "Breakdown of the Six Days" section]

⁶ The full text of Amer's speech can be found Israel's Foreign Ministry website:

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1947-1974/1%20Egypt-s%20Statement%20on%20Troop%20Movements%20into%20Sinai->

⁷ "The Six Day War." The Israel Foreign Ministry, Volumes 1-2: 1947-1974, Nov. 3, 2003,

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/THE+SIX-DAY+WAR+-+INTRODUCTION.htm>

⁸ United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, (Geneva: UN Publications 1958), pp. 132-134.

⁹ Oren, Michael, "The Six-Day War and it's Enduring Legacy," The Washington Institute, July 2, 2002,

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2080>

¹⁰ Pollack, Kenneth (2004). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991. University of Nebraska Press.

5-6 June: Early in the morning, the Israeli Air Force launches a series of raids against Egyptian airfields, attacking 19 bases and destroying 285-309 aircraft. The strikes eliminate 85% of the Egyptian air force. The Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi air forces attack oil refineries in Haifa Bay and an airfield in Megiddo. By evening, Jordan's air force is wiped out, the Syrians lose two-thirds of their total air strength, and the Iraqi air force loses several planes. After two days, Israel has destroyed 400 enemy aircraft, 94% of them on the ground. Israel loses 26 aircraft in action. During this time, Jordanian forces lob thousands of shells into Jewish West Jerusalem, destroying hundreds of buildings and killing 20 people.¹¹

7 June: After successful advances against the Jordanians in and around Jerusalem, and after 24 hours of internal debate and diplomatic outreach, the Israelis take over the Old City of Jerusalem. Before entering the city, Israel PM, Levi Eshkol sends a letter to King Hussein proposing that Jordan halt its attacks on Israeli territory, agree to a ceasefire, and begin peace talks. There is no response from Jordan.¹²

9 June: Israel begins ground operations against Syrian, hoping to secure its northeastern border after nearly two decades of Syrian attacks on the Galilee.

10 June: The war ends with Israeli forces in control of the Sinai Peninsula up to the Suez Canal, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.

19 June: Israel offers Egypt and Syria return of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights for a peace settlement to be negotiated directly. In the Golan, Israel offers to withdraw to the international border, not including territory conquered by Syria in 1948. The offer was transmitted through the United States, but turned down. Egypt and Syria refuse to negotiate with Israel.¹³

27 June: Israel officially annexes East Jerusalem. Because of the numerous holy sites in the Old City, Israel pointedly decides to respect the sensitive nature of these sacred places, ceding civilian authority over the Temple Mount to the Islamic Wakf authority. That day, the Knesset passes the Protection of Holy Places Law, stating: "*The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.*"¹⁴



11 Oren, Michael, "1967: The Unwanted War that Made The Middle East," in a speech given on June 24, 2002, <http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-06oren-speech.html>

12 Oren, Michael, "1967: The Unwanted War that Made The Middle East," in a speech given on June 24, 2002, <http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/02/02-06oren-speech.html>

13 Isseroff, Ami, "A Brief History of Israel and Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," <http://www.mideastweb.org/briefhistory.htm>

14 "Protection of Holy Places Law 5727," The Israeli Parliament website, <http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/HolyPlaces.htm>

1 September: Eight Arab heads of state attend an Arab League summit in Khartoum, Sudan, passing the “Khartoum Resolutions,” also known as “The Three No’s;”

- No to peace with Israel.
- No to recognition of Israel.
- No to negotiations with Israel.

The declaration dashed any hope for peace talks. As former Israeli President Chaim Herzog wrote: *"Israel's belief that the war had come to an end and that peace would now reign along the borders was soon dispelled."*¹⁵

November 22: The United Nations Security Council passes Resolution 242, calling for *"withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict in exchange for Arab acceptance of Israel."*¹⁶

1968: In the year following the Six-Day war, the PLO solidified its position in the West Bank and Gaza. Between September and December of 1968, the PLO launched 61 terrorist attacks against Israel, mostly against civilian targets, such as factories, movie theaters and private homes.¹⁷

15 Herzog, Chaim *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, NY: Random House, 1982, p. 195.

16 “The Situation in the Middle East,” The United Nations Documentation Center, November 22, 1967, <http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm>

17 Lorch, Netanel, *One Long War*, Jerusalem: Keter, 1976, pp. 139-146

Breakdown of Attacks against Israel leading up to the Six-Day War

Attacks on Israeli water sources by Syria, Egypt, the PLO and the Arab League

1958-9	Syria fired into Israel in a series of incidents intended to prevent the construction of an Israeli pumping station for water from the Jordan River. The station was being built according to guidelines set down by the Johnston Plan, brokered by the United States in 1955. ¹⁸
1964	The Arab League announces a water-diversion effort in an attempt to prevent Israel from completing its own water project. This was a strategic move intended to weaken the Jewish State. ¹⁹ King Hussein of Jordan claimed Israel's very existence was a "theft of Arab waters," and would ruin Jordan's saleable water supply; this claim was refuted by the Johnston Plan, which had allotted the amount of water that would be peacefully and safely divided among Lebanon (2.7%), Syria (10.3%), Jordan (56%), and Israel (31%).
1965	In January, Palestinian terrorists attempt to bomb Israel's National Water Carrier, which brings water from the Sea of Galilee to the rest of Israel. This was the first attack carried out by PLO's Fatah. In November, Syria fires on an Israeli patrol, and Israel responds by blocking Arab attempts to divert its water with a strategic air strike. However, attacks on t Israel's water projects persist.
1966	Syrian forces and Palestinian terror groups continue attacks on Israeli water facilities.
1967	In the spring of 1967, Palestinian groups blow several water pumps and destroy irrigation equipment in the north of Israel. ²⁰

Attacks on Israeli civilian communities in the north by the Syrian military

1957/58	From June 1957 to November 1958, there were regular and serious border clashes between Israel and Syria, provoked by consistent Syrian artillery shelling of Israeli villages in the upper Galilee. ²¹ From their vantage point in the Golan Heights 3,000 feet above the Galilee, Syrian forces targeted Jewish farmers in the Hulah Valley below. Jewish pioneers had been cultivating the valley since the early 1900s and had drained the swamps there, making the land suitable for agriculture.
1962/63	Between December 1962 and August 1963, Israel records 98 Syrian attacks including shelling and acts of sabotage.
1965	In January, the Syrians capture Israeli agent Eli Cohen, cutting off an important source of intelligence about Syrian deployments, particularly on the Golan. Cohen is executed that May.

¹⁸ Ofira Seliktar, "Turning Water Into Fire: The Jordan River As The Hidden Factor In The Six Day War," The Middle East Review of International Affairs, Volume 9, No. 2, Article 4 - June 2005

http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue2/jv9no2a4.html#_edn3

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "Highlights of Main Events 1948-1974," The Israel Foreign Ministry, April 28, 2002,

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/HIGHLIGHTS+OF+MAIN+EVENTS-+1947-1974.htm>

1966	<p>The IDF records 93 border incidents this year, the majority initiated by Syria.²² They included:²³</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 13 February: Syrians shoot at Israeli tractors with mortars. Israeli forces put two Syrian tanks out of action. • 21 February: Syrians fire mortars s at a patrol escorting fisherman on Sea of Galilee. • 29 March: Tractor driver wounded by Syrian machine gun fire. • 30 March: A second tractor driver wounded by Syrian artillery fire. • 30 April: Four Israeli workers wounded by Syrian machine gun fire. • 5 June: Syrians shell farm workers. • 6 June: Syrian shells set fields on fire. • 12 July: A tractor driver is seriously wounded by a Syrian mortar. A forest worker is killed by a Syrian mine. • 25 July: Serious clashes between Israel and Syria are followed by inconclusive UN Security Council debate.²⁴ • 15 August: Syrians open fire on a patrol boat. Five Israeli soldiers are wounded. • 6 September: Seven land reclamation officers wounded by a mine. • 26 September: Syrians fire on a fishing boat. • 9 October: Four border policemen killed by a Syrian mine.
1967	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 January: Israeli soldier wounded during a Syrian shelling. • 4 January: Syrians shoot at a farmer. • 7 January: Syria shells two Israeli settlements. A tractor driver narrowly escapes death. • 8 January: Syrians shell and machine gun three Israeli settlements. • 11 January: Two Israeli soldiers wounded during a tank duel. • 14 January: A young Israeli soldier killed by a Syrian landmine. • 15 January: Syrians shell a lake patrol boat. • 13 February: Syrians fire on an Israeli patrol. • 14 February: Syrian gunfire wounds an Israeli soldier. • 4 March: Tractor driver injured by Syrian mine. • 7 April: Syrian gunners fire on an Israeli tractor in the demilitarized zone. Artillery fire is exchanged and the fight escalates. Israel sends airplanes to take out Syrian gun positions. In a dogfight, Israel downs six Syrian MiG-21 planes.²⁵ • 8 April: 200 heavy mortar shells reduce the Israeli Gadot settlement to ruins. • 7 May: Syria shells Israeli village of Ein Gev.²⁶ • 2 January: Israeli soldier wounded by Syrian shelling. • 14 February: Syrian fire wounds an Israeli soldier. • 29 May: Renewed Syrian attacks on Israel.²⁷ • 3 June: Four Syrian commandos intercepted in Israel.

22 Ofira Seliktar, "Turning Water Into Fire: The Jordan River As The Hidden Factor In The Six Day War," *The Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Volume 9, No. 2, Article 4 - June 2005
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2005/issue2/jv9no2a4.html#_edn3

²³ Unless otherwise cited, the following incidents were taken from Martin Gilbert's Book *The Arab-Israeli Conflict – Its History in Maps* published by Steimatzky LTD in 1984, p. 63.

24 "Highlights of Main Events 1948-1974," The Israel Foreign Ministry, April 28, 2002,
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/HIGHLIGHTS+OF+MAIN+EVENTS-+1947-1974.htm>

25 Khouri, Fred J., *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East*, cited in
<http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/timeline.htm>

26 The New York Times, cited in <http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/timeline.htm>

27 The New York Times cited in <http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/timeline.htm>

Terrorist attacks throughout Israel by the PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization)²⁸

The PLO's methods of attack included blowing up private homes, firing at buses, planting land mines, demolishing water pumps, and murdering civilians.

1964	The PLO is established in 1964 with a Charter calling for destruction of Israel and expulsion of its citizens. By 1965, Yassir Arafat's Fatah organization based in Jordan and backed by other militant groups, launches series of cross-border attacks. The PLO's strategy, called "the entanglement theory," uses sabotage to provoke Israeli retaliation, which in turn rallies Arab opinion against Israel.
1965	PLO organizes 35 terrorist raids against Israel.
1966	PLO and its allies conduct 41 terrorist raids against Israel. On November 11, three Israeli soldiers are killed by Fatah mine.
1967	37 attacks launched in first four months of the year.

Sea blockade of Eilat by Egypt

1956	Egypt's President, Gamal Abdel Nasser decides to nationalize the Suez Canal and blockades the Straits of Tiran which provide the only access to Israel's southern port of Eilat on the Red Sea. Israel responds by invading and occupying the Sinai Peninsula for several months until a U.N. peacekeeping force is put in place and the right of free shipping to Eilat is guaranteed by international law. ²⁹	<p>United States President, Lyndon Johnson remarked after the Six Day War that:</p> <p><i>"If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Strait of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations.</i></p> <p>(Lukacs, Yehuda, Documents on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 1967-1983, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984)</p>
	As a result of the conflict, the U.N. declares Israeli shipping has a clear right to pass through the Tiran Straits. This was decided at the U.N.'s Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and confirmed at the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea on April 27, 1958. ³⁰ In 1950, Egypt itself had recognized the Tiran Straits as "free" in conformity with the recognized principles of international law.	
1967	On May 19, Egypt again blockades the Straits of Tiran, preventing the flow of oil and other goods into Eilat and cutting Israel's entire trade connections with the Far East. Prior to this, Israel clearly stated that closing the Straits would be considered an "act of war." Egypt's blockade of Eilat violated the 1957 U.N. agreements. Maritime nations, which under the agreements were supposed to intervene in the event of such violations, did nothing.	

²⁸ Lorch, Netanel, One Long War, Jerusalem: Keter, 1976, p. 110.

²⁹ "The Six Day War," PBS.org, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/hijacked/peopleevents/e_war.html

³⁰ United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, (Geneva: UN Publications 1958), pp. 132-134.

NOTE: On May 16, the commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Sinai (UNEF) was handed a letter from Egypt's Chief of Staff General Mohammad Fawzy asking that the peacekeepers be withdrawn immediately for their own safety. United Nations Secretary General U Thant tried to negotiate with the Egyptian government, but on May 18, the Egyptian Foreign Minister told governments with troops in the force that they must withdraw. Several countries began evacuating their soldiers. Egypt then informed U Thant that the Egyptian government had decided to terminate UNEF's presence in the Sinai and the Gaza Strip. On May 19, the UNEF commander was given the order to withdraw. Nasser immediately began massing tanks and troops on the border with Israel.

Israel's Diplomatic Efforts to Avoid War

- As Egypt began massing troops in the Sinai, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Levi Eshkol responded by reinforcing the Sinai-Israeli border with regular armored units on May 15. Israel immediately made it clear that this was strictly a defensive response and that **“Israel has no aggressive intentions whatsoever against any Arab state at all.”**³¹ Egypt's President Nasser responded to Israel's message a day later by saying *“We welcome the Israeli aggression, we welcome the battle we have long awaited...Egypt is now prepared to plunge into total war which will put an end to Israel.”*³²
- On May 18, Eshkol telegraphed President Johnson explaining Israel's precarious situation. He wrote, *“...You are correct, Mr. President, in stating that we are having our patience tried to the limits. There have been 15 attempts at murder and sabotage in the past six weeks. We have not reacted. This in itself proves that there is no lack of temperance and responsibility on our part. On the other hand, the problem is not solved indefinitely by inaction. We cannot always rely on the stroke of fortune which has so far prevented the terrorist acts from taking the toll of life and injury intended by the perpetrators...The Egyptian build-up of armor and infantry in Sinai...is greater than ever before, and has no objective justification. Egypt knows that there is no foundation for reports of troop concentration against Syria. This naturally forces me to undertake precautionary reinforcement in the south.”*³³
- In a speech to the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, on May 22, Prime Minister Eshkol said, *“In view of the mounting tension of late, the Big Powers ought to exercise their full influence in order to remove the danger of a conflagration in the Middle East...The concentrations of Egyptian forces in Sinai have reached proportions which increase the tension in our region and arouse world concern. The status quo must be restored on both sides of the border...I would like to say again to the Arab countries from this rostrum, particularly to Egypt and Syria, that we harbor no aggressive designs. We have no possible interest in violating their security, their territory, or their legitimate rights. Nor shall we interfere in any way in their internal affairs, their regimes, or their regional or international relations. We expect of them, according to the principles of reciprocity, the application of the same principles towards us.”*³⁴
- The Israeli cabinet met on May 23 and discussed launching a pre-emptive strike if the Straits of Tiran were not reopened within two days. Well before Egypt's closing of the straits, Israel had clearly and openly stated that such an action would be considered an “act of war.” **U.S. Undersecretary of State, Eugene Rostow consulted with Israeli leaders and persuaded them to delay any attack for at least 10 days to extend the possibility of a peaceful end to the conflict.** This was a major Israeli concession in the face of continuing Arab verbal threats and the enormous armies organizing around them, as well as the difficulty maintaining a mobilized predominantly civilian army.³⁵

31 Brecher, Michael, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1975

32 “The Six Day War.” The Israel Foreign Ministry, Volumes 1-2: 1947-1974, Nov. 3, 2003, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/THE+SIX-DAY+WAR+-+INTRODUCTION.htm>

33 “Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967” Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, Volume XIX, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/>

34 <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/UnderConstruction.htm?asperrorpath=/MFA/Templates/Hasava.aspx>

35 Gelpi, Christopher (2002). *Power of Legitimacy: Assessing the Role of Norms in Crisis Bargaining*. Princeton University Press.

The Six-Day War by the Numbers

- Number of estimated combined Syrian and PLO-organized attacks carried out against Israel from early 1966 to just before the '67 Six Day War³⁶: **200**
- Number of years before the Six-Day War that Syria bombarded Israel with consistent shelling, sabotage and land mines: **18**
- Number of terrorist attacks the PLO carried out against Israel in the six weeks before the war broke out: **19**
- Number of complaints Israel filed to the United Nations Security Council regarding illegal Syrian mine-laying and shelling activities in 1967 before the Six-Day War³⁷: **34**
- Number of Arab Troops amassed around Israel's Syrian, Jordanian and Egyptian border in the weeks leading up to the war: **Around 500,000** [see breakdown below].

PRE-WAR STATISTICS	ARAB STATES	ISRAEL
Fighter Planes	800	190
Navy Ships	217	37
Tanks	2,700	800
Breakdown of Arab Troops	Egypt: 180,000-240,000 Iraq: 70,000-75,000 Syria: 50,000-65,000 Jordan: 50,000-55,000 Saudi Arabia: 50,000 Lebanon: 12,000 Kuwait: 5,000 Algeria: 60,000 Total: 477,000-562,000* <small>*The above numbers cover the range of estimations recorded in a number of sources.</small>	Total: 250,000* <small>*This number implies the maximum size of the Israeli army at full mobilization, including reserves.</small>
Population Ratio	25	1
POST-WAR STATISTICS ³⁸	ARAB STATES	ISRAEL
Casualties	Between 15,000 & 20,000	759
Wounded	45,000	2,586

³⁶ Please see the "Breakdown of Attacks Against Israel Leading up to the Six-Day War" section in this booklet for a breakdown of these attacks and more.

³⁷ Taken from an address by Israel's Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol to the Israeli Parliament on May 22, 1967, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1947-1974/3%20Statement%20to%20the%20Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Eshko>

³⁸ "The Six-Day War, Introduction," The Israel Foreign Ministry, November 3, 2003, Volumes 1-2: 1947-1974 <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/THE+SIX-DAY+WAR+-+INTRODUCTION.htm>

Political and Military Leadership³⁹

Below is a breakdown of the individuals and groups that played important roles before, during and after the conflict:

<p><u>Egypt</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Gamal Abdel Nasser: Egyptian President• Abel Amer: Commander and Chief• Mahmound Riad: Foreign Minister• Mohammed Kony: Ambassador to UN• Anwar Sadat: Legislator	<p><u>Jordan</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hussein ibn Talal: King• Mohammad Farra: Ambassador to the UN
<p><u>Israel</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Levi Eshkol: Prime Minister• Abba Eban: Foreign Minister• Moshe Dayan: Defense Minister• Yitzhak Rabin: Chief of Staff• Ezer Weizman: Chief of Operations• Ephraim Euron: Minister to the US• David Ben Gurion: Former Prime Minister• Menachem Begin: Opposition Leader	<p><u>Syria</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Nureddin Attassi: President• Yousef Zayyen: Prime Minister• Hafez Assad: Defense Minister• Fatah: Guerrilla Organization• Ba'th: Ruling Government Party

³⁹"Air Strategy in the 1967 Arab/Israeli War," Global Security.org,
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Hughes-ii.htm>

Six Days

Day One – 5 June⁴⁰

- War breaks out at 7:10 A.M. and within half an hour 200 Israeli planes are airborne.
- Israeli P.M., Levi Eshkol sends a message to King Hussein of Jordan, via the U.N. Chief of Staff in Jerusalem, stating that Israel has no intent of attacking Jordan:

“We are engaged in defensive fighting on the Egyptian sector, and we shall not engage ourselves in any action against Jordan, unless Jordan attacks us.”⁴¹

- Around 8:15 A.M. the ground war begins and Israeli tanks cross into the Sinai Peninsula.
- King Hussein of Jordan announces at 9:30 A.M., on Radio Amman, that Jordan is under attack - even though Israel did not attack Jordan.
- At 10:20 A.M. Jordan begins artillery bombardment of Jerusalem.
- The Israel Air Force (IAF) strikes Syrian and Egyptian air force bases. By 10:30 A.M. more than half of Egypt’s war planes are destroyed.
- At 11:15 A.M. the Arab Legion starts firing 6,000 shells into the Jewish section of Jerusalem and by 11:50 A.M. Jordanian planes bomb Netanya and Kfar Saba.
- By 12:40 P.M. the IAF destroys Jordan’s two main air force bases. Heavy fighting ensues between Jordan and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in the West Bank.
- The IDF captures Rafah at the southern end of the Gaza Strip and advances into the Sinai Peninsula.

Day Two – 6 June

- The IDF advances into Sinai, the West Bank and Jerusalem. By 5:15 A.M., the IDF reaches Ammunition Hill, a strategic position in the north east overlooking the walls of the Old City. There is heavy hand-to-hand fighting there. Israeli forces break through and advance to Herod’s Gate outside of the Old City just after 7 A.M.
- The IDF takes Al-Arish and Jabal Libni in northern Sinai and Egyptian troops in Sinai begin to retreat.
- Egypt, Syria, Sudan, Algeria, Iraq, Mauritania and Yemen sever diplomatic ties with the United States and halt oil exports to the U.S. and Britain.
- Syrian troops shell northern Israel, advancing toward Kibbutz Dan.

40 Oren, Michael B., “Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East.” New York: Oxford University Press, 2002; “Israel’s Foreign Relations 1947-1974,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Volumes 1-2, Number 11, Feb. 16, 2003,

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreign%20relations/israels%20foreign%20relations%20since%201947/1947-1974/#XI>

41 “Message from Prime Minister Eshkol to King Hussein- 5 June 1967,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 5, 1967,

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/16+Message+from+Prime+Minister+Eshkol+to+King+Huss.htm>

- The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) passes resolution 233, calling for an immediate cease-fire [See Index]

Day Three – 7 June

- The IDF liberates Jerusalem.
- The IDF captures all of the West Bank and Gaza.
- UNSC passes resolution 234, calling again for an immediate cease-fire [See Index]. Jordan agrees to cease-fire.

Day Four – 8 June

- The IDF takes all of the Sinai Peninsula after reaching the Suez Canal and Egypt finally agrees to a cease-fire.
- The *USS Liberty*, a U.S. supply vessel, is mistakenly identified as an Egyptian warship sailing close to the Egyptian coast and is sunk by Israeli naval forces. [see *USS Liberty* section]

Day Five – 9 June

- Syria continues shelling northern Israel, the Hula Valley and the Galilee. By 10:00 A.M., IDF forces advance toward Syrian troops concentrated on the Golan Heights.
- Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser resigns; hours later he withdraws his resignation
- The UNSC passes resolution 235: [See Index]
- By nightfall, IDF troops storm key Syrian strongholds and strategic positions in the Golan..

Day Six – 10 June

- Israel occupies all of the Golan Heights, capturing the city of Quneitra.
- By nightfall. Israel controls Mount Hermon, the highest point in the region where the borders of Israel, Syria and Lebanon meet.
- Syria accepts UNSC resolution 235.
- The USSR and all other eastern European countries except Romania sever diplomatic ties with Israel.

The *USS Liberty*, 8 June 1967⁴²

During the war, Israel's air force conducted reconnaissance flights to prevent a possible Egyptian sea-borne attack on the Gaza coast. U.S. vessels were deployed 240 miles (386 km) from the war zone, close enough to ensure that Soviet submarines stationed in the Mediterranean would not be able to join the war.

The night of June 7, the U.S. Joint Chief of Staff sent five cables to the *USS Liberty*'s skipper, commanding the ship to stay more than 100 miles (160km) away from the Sinai coast. However, the *Liberty*'s captain never received the cables. The stage was set for a disastrous chain of misunderstandings and miscommunications leading to tragedy.

Next morning an Israeli naval observer spotted the ship at 5:55 A.M., floating 70 miles (112km) from the Gaza shoreline. At Israel naval headquarters in Haifa, the ship was identified as an American vessel – the *USS Liberty* – and labeled neutral.

The *Liberty* was seen again at 9:00 A.M. by an Israeli pilot 20 miles (32km) north of Al-Arish, a coastal city in northern Sinai. Neither Israeli sighting of the *Liberty* ship reported seeing an American flag.

Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin told U.S. Commander, Ernest Carl Castle, America's naval attaché to Tel Aviv, that Israel would protect her shores at any cost. He warned that if the U.S. had any ships in the vicinity, they should be identified. Subsequently, events unfolded as follows:

- At about 9:24 A.M., after the *USS Liberty* was spotted near Al-Arish, a large explosion occurred off of the coast. Israel believed that Egypt was bombing IDF positions from the sea.
- Just after noon, Israel deploys three torpedo boats to destroy the presumed enemy ship attacking Israeli positions nears Al-Arish
- The combat information officer at the time believed that the *USS Liberty* was an enemy ship since it had turned around and was now traveling towards Port Said, near the Suez Canal. The torpedo boats were ordered to verify whether the vessel was American or not and if not, to attack.
- Air support flew over the ship to determine its identity but did not see any markings on the vessel that indicated it was American.
- Around 2:00 P.M., Israeli jets attack the ship, having concluded it was Egyptian.
- Only after 5:00 P.M. was the true identity of the *USS Liberty* realized.

Thirty four American servicemen died and 171 were wounded. Following the tragic accident, Israel apologized to the U.S. government and the families who lost loved ones. Israel also paid monetary compensation for the damage done to the vessel.

42 Oren, Michael B., *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 262 -271.

Index of Speeches, Statements and Documents

I. Pre-Six Day War Statements by Israeli and Arab Figures

Israel—

Israel's Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol (PM from 1963-1969)

On May 12, 1967, PM Eshkol stated that Israel needed to respond to Syria's continued attacks on civilians and sabotage operations. *"In view of the fourteen incidents of sabotage and infiltration perpetrated in the past month alone, Israel may have no other choice but to adopt suitable countermeasures against the focal points of sabotage. Israel will continue to take action to prevent any and all attempts to perpetrate sabotage within her territory. There will be no immunity for any state which aids or abets such acts."*⁴³

On May 22, in an address to the Knesset, PM Eshkol said: *"In the face of Syrian aggression we have tried, in vain, to exhaust all political measures of restraint. When acts of aggression continued and increased in gravity, we considered it necessary in certain cases to exercise our right of self-defense...I would like to say again to the Arab countries from this rostrum, particularly to Egypt and Syria, that we harbor no aggressive designs. We have no possible interest in violating either their security, their territory, or their legitimate rights. Nor shall we interfere in any way in their internal affairs, their regimes, or their regional or international relations. We expect of them, according to the principles of reciprocity, the application of the same principles towards us...In conclusion, I call upon all the peoples of the Middle East for reciprocal respect for the sovereignty, integrity, and international rights of each of our countries. Israel, with complete confidence in its defensive capacity and its steadfastness of strength and spirit, expresses at this hour its readiness to participate in an effort to reinforce stability and advance peace in our region."*⁴⁴

On June 6, a day after the war had begun, Eshkol told the Knesset: *"During the past few weeks we have done our best to induce influential international factors in the West and the East to exercise political influence in order to remove the danger from our borders, open the straits and restore the status quo. Our hopes were not fulfilled."*⁴⁵

Israel Foreign Minister, Abba Eban

A day after Israel began its first air strike on Egypt's forces in Sinai, Eban presented the United Nations Security Council with the following statement:

"An army, greater than any force ever assembled in history in Sinai, had massed against Israel's southern frontier. Egypt had dismissed the United Nations forces which symbolized the international interest in the maintenance of peace in our region. Nasser had provocatively brought five infantry divisions and two armored divisions up to our very gates; 80,000 men and 900 tanks were poised to move...Terrorist troops came regularly into our territory to kill, plunder and set off explosions; the most recent occasion was five days ago. In short, there was peril for Israel wherever it looked. Its manpower had been hastily mobilized. Its economy and commerce were

43 Abba Eban, [Abba Eban: An Autobiography](#). Random House. ISBN 0-394-49302-8

44 "Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol - 22 May 1967," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 5, 1967, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/18+Statement+to+the+Knesset+by+Prime+Minister+Eshk.htm>

45 "Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol - 5 June 1967," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 5, 1967, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/18+Statement+to+the+Knesset+by+Prime+Minister+Eshk.htm>

*beating with feeble pulses. Its streets were dark and empty. There was an apocalyptic air of approaching peril. And Israel faced this danger alone.*⁴⁶

Arabs—

Egyptian President Nasser

Leading up to the breakout of war, the Egyptian president taunted and challenged Israel's security almost daily. Just after Nasser illegally coerced the United Nations security force to leave the Sinai on May 19, he said the following:

*"As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We shall not complain any more to the UN about Israel. The sole method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence."*⁴⁷

"Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight," Nasser said on May 27. The following day, he added: ***"We will not accept any...coexistence with Israel...Today the issue is not the establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel....The war with Israel was in effect since 1948."***⁴⁸

Mohamed Heikel, Egyptian journalist and advisor to President Nasser

On May 26, in Egypt's government-sponsored newspaper, *Al-Ahram*, Heikel summed up the Egyptian position on closing the Tiran Straits, emphasizing its intention to incite a war with Israel.

Closing the Straits of Tiran *"...put Israel in a situation where it had to react...for many reasons, chiefly the psychological, Israel cannot accept or remain indifferent to what has taken place...Israel has to reply now. It has to deal a blow...Then it will be our turn to deal a second blow, which we will deliver with the utmost possible effectiveness...Let Israel begin! Let our second blow then be ready! Let it be a knockout!"*⁴⁹

Iraqi President, Abdur Rahman Aref,

*"The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear—to wipe Israel off the map."*⁵⁰
(May 31, 1967)

(On June 4, Iraq joined the military alliance with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria)

Syrian Defense Minister, Hafez Assad

*"Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of "liquidation" itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in Israel. The Syrian army, with its finger on the trigger, is united....I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation."*⁵¹ (May 20, 1967)

46 "Statement to the Security Council by Foreign Minister Eban – 6 June 1967," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 6, 1967, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/UnderConstruction.htm?aspxerrorpath=/MFA/Templates/Hasava.aspx>

47 Leibler, Isi, *The Case For Israel*, Australia: The Globe Press, 1972, p. 60

48 Leibler, Isi, *The Case For Israel*, Australia: The Globe Press, 1972, p. 18

49 Laqueur, Walter, *The Road to War*, cited in <http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/timeline.htm>

50 Leibler, Isi, *The Case For Israel*, Australia: The Globe Press, 1972, p. 18

51 Leibler, Isi, *The Case For Israel*, Australia: The Globe Press, 1972, p. 60

Syrian President, Nureddin al-Attasi

On February 22 1967, the Syrian president urged his countrymen to rally support to attack Israel. *"...It is the duty of us now to move from defensive positions to offensive positions and enter the battle to liberate the usurped land...Everyone must face the test and enter the battle to the end."* ⁵²

In a May 22, 1966 speech to Syrian troops, Al-Attasi announced *"We want a full scale, popular war of liberation... to destroy the Zionist enemy"* ⁵³

Palestinian Authority Chairman, Ahmed Shukairy

"Those [Jews] who survive will remain in Palestine. I estimate that none of them will survive." (June 1, 1967) ⁵⁴

The United Nations –

UN Secretary General, U Thant

As UN security forces pulled out of the Sinai upon Egypt's request, and after 19 acts of terrorism in six weeks by the PLO on Israel, Secretary General, U. Thant expressed his worries about Syria, Egypt and the PLO's provocation of war.

"Al Fatah activities consisting of terrorism and sabotage are a major factor in that they provoke strong reactions in Israel by the Government and people alike. Some recent incidents of this type have seemed to indicate a new level of organization and training of those who participate in these actions." ⁵⁵

52 Draper, Theodore, *Israel and World Politics: Roots of the third Arab-Israeli War*, Secker and Warburg, 1968

53 Oren, Michael, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.20.

54 Draper, Theodore: [Israel and world politics: Roots of the third Arab-Israeli war](http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/timeline.htm), Secker & Warburg, 1968, cited in <http://www.sixdaywar.co.uk/timeline.htm>

55 Abba Eban, [Abba Eban: An Autobiography](#), Random House

II. Broadcast to the nation by Prime Minister Eshkol – 5 June 1967⁵⁶

Citizens of Israel:

Since the hours of this morning our forces, on land and in the air, are returning war with a view to vanquishing the armies of the aggressive ruler of Egypt.

Egypt has forced a military campaign upon us, and all of us - the entire nation the soldiers in the front line and the civilians in the rear, will stand fast with courage and good cheer. We shall repulse the enemy and defeat his army.

Throughout the years since he assumed power, the ruler of Egypt has been announcing his plan and his preparations to attack Israel in order to destroy it. During the past three weeks he has not concealed from the world the fact that the time has come to carry out his scheme.

A great army, with its armor, cannons and planes, has been moved into east Sinai and posted close to our southern border; the UN Emergency Force has been ejected and the Strait of Tiran has been blocked to Israeli and to international shipping.

Arrogantly and braggingly, Nasser has made a mockery of international law, has scorned the Charter of the United Nations, and has brought to naught mankind's aspiration to peace.

In addition to the agreement between him and Syria, the Egyptian ruler has, during these very days, concluded military treaties with Jordan and Iraq with the purpose of encircling us with an ever-tightening noose.

Our forces are strong enough to frustrate the schemes of the aggressor.

Israel strives for peace, but in order to protect peace we have built up mighty, resourceful, well-trained defense forces, equipped with top-quality modern weapons and deployed according to the best rules of military warfare.

Our soldiers - on land, in the air and at sea - are accompanied by the love and trust of the nation, are inspired by a spirit of bravery and are commanded by a capable and experienced corps of officers. Our army is deployed against any danger, capable of defending the State and defeating any aggressor.

The nation sends its blessings to its soldiers who dedicate their lives to the defense of our country: Be courageous and of good cheer!

To the citizens in the rear I say: Let each and every one of you manifest level-headedness; let everyone do his job, with dedication and efficiency, and put all his forces at the service of victory.

During these days which are liable to be a time of a cruel and bloody campaign, the distinction between front and rear may become blunted. In these days the entire nation is an army, all of Israel is a frontline. Each and every one of us, wherever he may be, and at all times, is in duty bound to consider himself responsible for the defense of Israel. All of us, headed by our army, shall vanquish those rising up against us.

Today we shall know who will lend us his support. These days are a testing time for the nations of the world

⁵⁶ "Broadcast to the nation by Prime Minister Eshkol – 5 June 1967," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 5, 1967, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/15+Broadcast+to+the+Nation+by+Prime+Minister+Eshko.htm>

-whether they will join in the heavy campaign, lend a loyal hand to our defense, and help us check the aggressor.

I fervently hope that peace-loving nations and states will not stand by but will understand the right of Israel to live its life without the sword of aggression hanging over its head.

At this juncture let us point to the ever-growing wonderful manifestations of solidarity on the part of Jews throughout the world. This solidarity of the Jewish people with the State of Israel elates us and inspires us with confidence. The feelings of brotherhood and unity which throb in the heart of every Jew brings far ones close and builds bridges across distances. The Jewish heart, wherever it is, now beats with the State of Israel, yearning for its victory.

Citizens of Israel!

Even as the cannons roar we shall not cease from longing for peace. Our only desire is to remove from our borders any threat of sabotage and every danger of aggression, to safeguard our security and the fullness of our rights.

Again we announce: We shall not attack any state as long as it does not wage war against us. But anyone attacking us will meet with our full power of self-defense and our capacity to defeat his forces.

Moreover, the Israel Defense Forces have been instructed to refrain from striking the civilian population, but it is only proper for the enemy to know that these orders will remain in force only as long as he does not strike our population.

Today we stand up in the battle forced upon us, consolidated and strong as we have never been before, trusting in the Rock of Israel, relying upon the valor of the Israel Defense Forces and their power to defeat our enemies and to safeguard peace.

III. Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol, 5 June 1967⁵⁷

Mr. Speaker,

Before I submit the expansion of the Government for approval, I must report to the Knesset and the nation on the momentous developments for the State of Israel that have taken place today.

Mr. Speaker, Members of the Knesset,

Heavy battles started this morning between the Egyptian air force and the Israeli air force. In these battles the Egyptian air force was heavily defeated. During the day the Syrian and Jordanian air forces also launched attacks, and they also suffered severe blows from our air force.

Since the morning our land and air forces were compelled to hit back against the enemy in order to rout the forces of the aggressive Egyptian dictator. The battle is still in full swing. Our army has not disappointed expectations - it is standing the test. And it will successfully confront any further tests it may have to face.

The battles are now taking place beyond Israel's borders, on the soil of Sinai. For obvious reasons I cannot

⁵⁷ "Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol - 5 June 1967," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 5, 1967, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/18+Statement+to+the+Knesset+by+Prime+Minister+Eshk.htm>

now give details - either numbers, names or places - but I can say that our forces are steadily repulsing the enemy.

In my morning broadcast I emphasized that Israel would not attack any country so long as it did not start war against us, but that anyone who attacked us would meet our full capacity to defend ourselves and defeat his forces.

Despite this warning Syrian and Jordanian forces have joined in the hostilities against Israel by air bombardment, and artillery and small arms fire - witness Jerusalem more than any other place. The forces of these countries have opened fire on various sectors, including Jerusalem, our Capital. The Israel Defense Forces have started counter-operations, as required in order to defend the country.

Members of the Knesset,

It is by no means superfluous to survey briefly the background to the latest events. On the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab armies tried to destroy the State in its infancy. After our forces had successfully resisted superior enemy forces, armistice agreements were signed between Israel and its neighbors. These agreements, as stated in the text, were designed to serve as a transition to permanent peace, but the Arab countries refused to negotiate for peace and started preparations to destroy Israel on the field of battle.

In open violation of the armistice agreements and the UN Charter, the Arab countries imposed boycott and blockade on Israel, declared that they maintained a state of belligerency against Israel and rejected all proposals to negotiate for a settlement. In brief, they tried to make Israel a country discriminated against in comparison with all the other countries in the world, they tried to exclude it from the applicability of international law, to put it beyond the bounds of normal relations between the nations of the world.

After ten years of relative tranquility on our southern border, the position was fundamentally undermined because of a series of aggressive steps taken by the Egyptian dictator.

This state of belligerency and aggression has continued without a pause for nineteen years. There were periods of relaxation, alternating with the intensification of Arab acts of hostility against us. About three weeks ago there started a threat to Israel, which is perhaps unequalled since the establishment of the State.

The first step was the introduction of a powerful Egyptian force into eastern Sinai; the next - the removal of the UN force; and next - the belligerent step of closing the Straits of Tiran to Israeli and international shipping - these measures being accompanied by feverish preparations for a total war of extermination against Israel.

At first, the Egyptian dictator cunningly announced that he was acting in order to deter Israel from attacking Syria. He disseminated the falsehood that Israeli forces were, as he said, concentrated on the northern frontier. It was no use denying these stories; it was no use the UN Secretariat confirming that these concentrations were a figment of the imagination. Nasser soon showed his cards: from false claims that it was his purpose to defend Syria, he went on to altering the status quo in the Straits of Tiran. Nasser did not conceal his desire to turn back the wheels of history, to the time before 1948; his plan was to strangle the independence of Israel in its own country.

With a view to encircling Israel, he put into operation the Defense treaty with Syria, which has been responsible for acts of violence during the past two years, and to complete the attempt at encirclement, he recently concluded treaties with Jordan and Iraq.

In Sinai, opposite our frontier, there were deployed until this morning five divisions of infantry and two armored divisions, with 900 tanks along the frontier 200 of them opposite Eilat, with the obvious intention of

cutting off the southern Negev; Iraqi troops and Egyptian commando units reached Jordan; the Jordanian army was placed under Egyptian command. During the past ten days, Egyptian air sorties have been carried out in Israeli skies.

After Nasser's statement of his intention to conduct a general war against Israel, the Commander of the Egyptian forces in Sinai, General Mortagi, issued an Order of the Day to his soldiers, which was quoted on Cairo Radio on 3 June, in the following terms:

"The eyes of the whole world are upon you in your glorious war against the aggression of the Israeli imperialists on the soil of your homeland, in the expectation, of seeing the results of your holy war for the conquest of the rights of the Arab people. The results of this unique moment are of historic importance for our Arab nation and for the holy war through which you will restore the rights of the Arabs which have been stolen in Palestine and conquer again the plundered soil of Palestine, by the mercy of God and the power of justice, by the force of arms and the unity of your faith."

During the past few weeks we have done our best to induce influential international factors in West and East to exercise political influence in order to remove the danger from our borders, open the straits and restore the status quo. Our hopes were not fulfilled.

While we were hoping for deterrent international influence by the intervention of Heads of State, the order of magnitude of the aggressive forces of Egypt and the other Arab countries under Egyptian leadership steadily grew, the belligerent incitement of the Egyptian dictator and his helpers reached unheard-of heights, and Israel was imminently threatened by an attack on several fronts.

In these days, which are liable to be days of brutal and bloodstained struggle, the boundaries between front and rear are blurred. In these days, the entire nation is an army; the entire country is one front. Each and every one of us, everywhere and at all times, must regard himself as responsible for Israel's Defense. All of us, headed by our Army, will rout our attackers.

Let us pay tribute to the continually growing manifestations of support from our people in the Diaspora. The identification of the Jewish people with the State of Israel fills us with confidence. The consciousness of the fraternity and unity that inspire every Jew brings us closer together and bridges the distances. The Jewish heart, wherever it may be, now beats with the State of Israel and longs for its victory.

I should also like to express from the rostrum of the Knesset our profound appreciation to the very many non-Jews, statesmen and intellectuals, as well as men in the street, who have been shocked at the threat to Israel and whose feelings have found expression in a wave of sympathy for our country, the like of which we have never known before.

Even during the battles, we do not abandon our aspiration for peace. I want to ask the Arab States, which for almost 20 years have chosen the path of threats and aggression instead of the path of cooperation and peace: what good have these methods done them?

Precious resources have been squandered to finance the cold and hot war against Israel. Since 1952, Egypt alone has spent over 4,000 million dollars to establish its military force. All the Arab countries and Israel have spent in the same period over 10,000 million dollars on military purposes. This sum would have been sufficient to deliver extensive strata of the peoples of the area from poverty and disease and to lay the foundation for dynamic social and economic progress. The time has come for a thorough heart-searching on the part of the Arab peoples, which will perhaps lead them to prefer peace and progress to hatred and bloodshed. At this hour, I would venture to say that peace will surely come to our region, even if it is delayed, for we all need it.

To the leaders of nations, in East and West, I want to say from this rostrum: Competition between Powers and blocs has made no slight contribution to the intensification of the arms race in the Middle East and the constant growth of the tension in our area. For years we have called for international action for the advancement of peace in our area; we have demanded the ending of the arms race, with a view to disarmament under mutual inspection by the countries in the area. To my regret, our demands have not borne the fruits we wished. May the lesson be learned for the future.

Members of the Knesset,

Since the beginning of the present tension views were heard in favor of the expansion of the Government and its parliamentary base. When I felt that the testing time was approaching, I took the initiative for the establishment of a broad emergency Government, and I asked the Gahal and Rafi parties to join the Government. As you are aware, these negotiations have been successful, and I welcome the expansion of the Government.

In view of the emergency conditions, the Ministers-elect have been inducted into their responsibilities even before the Knesset has confirmed them in their membership of the Government.

I am confident that the new Ministers now realize, even more than they did before, how strong is the military force that we have developed and fostered since the establishment of the State, and especially during the past few years. A strong, powerful and highly effective force has been established, which does not lag behind in using the most recent discoveries of science and technology. The Ministers-elect have seen the Israel Defense Forces in a state of mobilization and I am confident that they have been deeply impressed by the excellent planning of the General Staff and the operational skill of the Army. I am confident that this force will lead us to victory, and the expansion of the Government will strengthen us and help us to overcome the difficulties.

Members of the Knesset,

a) In accordance with Article 11e of the Transition Law 1949, I have the honor to state that the Government has decided to meet my request to release me from my duties as Minister of Defense from the moment the Knesset confirms the appointment of Mr. Moshe Dayan, Member of the Knesset, as Minister of Defense.

b) In accordance with Article 11d of the Transition Law 1949, I have the honor to announce that the Government has decided on the co-option of three additional members to the Government, namely: Mr. Menahem Begin, as Minister, Mr. Yosef Sapir as Minister, and Mr. Moshe Dayan as Minister of Defense.

c) In accordance with Article 11a of the Transition Law 1949, I hereby announce that Mr. Zvi Dinstein has ceased to serve as Deputy Minister of Defense.

I request the approval of the Knesset for this announcement.

Members of the Knesset,

Today we face a war which has been forced upon us, united and strong as never before, trusting in the Rock of Israel, confident in the fortitude of our people, relying on the valor of the Israel Defense Forces and their capacity to defeat the enemy and ensure peace.

IV. Statement to the Security Council by Foreign Minister Eban, 6 June 1967⁵⁸

I thank you, Mr. President, for giving me this opportunity to address the Council. I have just come from Jerusalem to tell the Security Council that Israel, by its independent effort and sacrifice, has passed from serious danger to successful resistance.

Two days ago Israel's condition caused much concern across the humane and friendly world. Israel had reached a somber hour. Let me try to evoke the point at which our fortunes stood.

An army, greater than any force ever assembled in history in Sinai, had massed against Israel's southern frontier. Egypt had dismissed the United Nations forces which symbolized the international interest in the maintenance of peace in our region. Nasser had provocatively brought five infantry divisions and two armored divisions up to our very gates; 80,000 men and 900 tanks were poised to move.

A special striking force, comprising an armored division with at least 200 tanks, was concentrated against Eilat at the Negev's southern tip. Here was a clear design to cut the southern Negev off from the main body of our State. For Egypt had openly proclaimed that Eilat did not form part of Israel and had predicted that Israel itself would soon expire. The proclamation was empty; the prediction now lies in ruin. While the main brunt of the hostile threat was focused on the southern front, an alarming plan of encirclement was under way. With Egypt's initiative and guidance, Israel was already being strangled in its maritime approaches to the whole eastern half of the world. For sixteen years, Israel had been illicitly denied passage in the Suez Canal, despite the Security Council's decision of 1 September 1951 [Resolution 95 (1951)]. And now the creative enterprise of ten patient years which had opened an international route across the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba had been suddenly and arbitrarily choked. Israel was and is breathing only with a single lung.

Jordan had been intimidated, against its better interest, into joining a Defense pact. It is not a Defense pact at all: it is an aggressive pact, of which I saw the consequences with my own eyes yesterday in the shells falling upon institutions of health and culture in the City of Jerusalem. Every house and street in Jerusalem now came into the range of fire as a result of Jordan's adherence to this pact; so also did the crowded and pathetically narrow coastal strip in which so much of Israel's life and population is concentrated.

Iraqi troops reinforced Jordanian units in areas immediately facing vital and vulnerable Israel communication centers. Expeditionary forces from Algeria and Kuwait had reached Egyptian territory. Nearly all the Egyptian forces which had been attempting the conquest of the Yemen had been transferred to the coming assault upon Israel. Syrian units, including artillery, overlooked the Israel villages in the Jordan Valley. Terrorist troops came regularly into our territory to kill, plunder and set off explosions; the most recent occasion was five days ago.

In short, there was peril for Israel wherever it looked. Its manpower had been hastily mobilized. Its economy and commerce were beating with feeble pulses. Its streets were dark and empty. There was an apocalyptic air of approaching peril. And Israel faced this danger alone.

We were buoyed up by an unforgettable surge of public sympathy across the world. The friendly Governments expressed the rather ominous hope that Israel would manage to live, but the dominant theme of our condition was danger and solitude.

Now there could be no doubt about what was intended for us. With my very ears I heard President Nasser's

⁵⁸ "Statement to the Security Council by Foreign Minister Eban – 6 June 1967," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 6, 1967, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/19+Statement+to+the+Security+Council+by+Foreign+Mi.htm>

speech on 26 May. He said:

"We intend to open a general assault against Israel. This will be total war. Our basic aim will be to destroy Israel."

On 2 June, the Egyptian Commander in Sinai, General Mortagi, published his Order of the Day, calling on his troops to wage a war of 'destruction against Israel. Here, then, was a systematic, overt, proclaimed design at politicide, the murder of a State.

The policy, the arms, the men had all been brought together, and the State thus threatened with collective assault was itself the last sanctuary of a people which had seen six million of its sons exterminated by a more powerful dictator two decades before.

The question then widely asked in Israel and across the world was whether we had not already gone beyond the utmost point of danger. Was there any precedent in world history, for example, for a nation passively to suffer the blockade of its only southern port, involving nearly all its vital fuel, when such acts of war, legally and internationally, have always invited resistance? This was a most unusual patience. It existed because we had acceded to the suggestion of some of the maritime States that we give them scope to concert their efforts in order to find an international solution which would ensure the maintenance of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba for ships of all nations and of all flags.

As we pursued this avenue of international solution, we wished the world to have no doubt about our readiness to exhaust every prospect, however fragile, of a diplomatic solution - and some of the prospects that were suggested were very fragile indeed.

But as time went on, there was no doubt that our margin of general security was becoming smaller and smaller. Thus, on the morning of 5 June, when Egyptian forces engaged us by air and land, bombarding the villages of Kissufim, Nahal-Oz and Ein Hasheloshah we knew that our limit of safety had been reached, and perhaps passed. In accordance with its inherent right of self-Defense as formulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, Israel responded defensively in full strength. Never in the history of nations has armed force been used in a more righteous or compelling cause.

Even when engaged with Egyptian forces, we still hoped to contain the conflict. Egypt was overtly bent on our destruction, but we still hoped that others would not join the aggression. Prime Minister Eshkol, who for weeks had carried the heavy burden of calculation and decision, published and conveyed a message to other neighboring States proclaiming:

"We shall not attack any country unless it opens war on us. Even now, when the mortars speak, we have not given up our quest for peace. We strive to repel all menace of terrorism and any danger of aggression to ensure our security and our legitimate rights."

In accordance with this same policy of attempting to contain the conflict, yesterday I invited General Bull, the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization, to inform the heads of the Jordanian State that Israel had no desire to expand the conflict beyond the unfortunate dimensions that it had already assumed and that if Israel were not attacked on the Jordan side, it would not attack and would act only in self-Defense. It reached my ears that this message had been duly and faithfully conveyed and received. Nevertheless, Jordan decided to join the Egyptian posture against Israel and opened artillery attacks across the whole long frontier, including Jerusalem. Those attacks are still in progress.

To the appeal of Prime Minister Eshkol to avoid any further extension of the conflict, Syria answered at 12.25 yesterday morning by bombing Megiddo from the air and bombing Degania at 12.40 with artillery fire and kibbutz Ein Hammifrats and Kurdani with long-range guns. But Jordan embarked on a much more

total assault by artillery and aircraft along the entire front, with special emphasis on Jerusalem, to whose dangerous and noble ordeal yesterday I come to bear personal witness.

There has been bombing of houses; there has been a hit on the great new National Museum of Art; there has been a hit on the University and on Shaare Zedek, the first hospital ever to have been established outside the ancient walls. Is this not an act of vandalism that deserves the condemnation of all mankind? And in the Knesset building, whose construction had been movingly celebrated by the entire democratic world ten months ago, the Israel Cabinet and Parliament met under heavy gunfire, whose echoes mingled at the end of our meeting with Hatikvah, the anthem of hope.

Thus throughout the day and night of 5 June, the Jordan which we had expressly invited to abstain from needless slaughter became, to our surprise, and still remains, the most intense of all the belligerents; and death and injury, as so often in history, stalk Jerusalem's streets.

When the approaching Egyptian aircraft appeared on our radar screens, soon to be followed by artillery attacks on our villages near the Gaza Strip, I instructed Mr. Rafael to inform the Security Council, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. I know that that involved arousing you, Mr. President, at a most uncongenial hour of the night, but we felt that the Security Council should be most urgently seized.

I should, however, be less than frank if I were to conceal the fact that the Government and people of Israel have been disconcerted by some aspects of the United Nations role in this conflict. The sudden withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force was not accompanied, as it should have been, by due international consultations on the consequences of that withdrawal. Moreover, Israel interests were affected; they were not adequately explored. No attempt was made, little time given, to help Israel to surmount grave prejudice to its vital interests consequent on that withdrawal. After all, a new confrontation of forces suddenly arose. It suddenly had to be met and at Sharm el-Sheikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, the Strait of Tiran, legality walked out and blockade walked in. The peace of the world trembled. And thus the United Nations had somehow been put into a position of leaving Sinai safe for belligerency.

It is not, I think, a question of sovereignty that is here involved. The United Nations has a right to ask that, when it assumes a function, the termination of that function shall not take place in conditions that would lead to anti-Charter situations. I do not raise this point in order to linger upon that which is past, but because of Israel's general attitude to the peace-keeping functions of this Organization. And I confess that my own attitude and those of my colleagues and of my fellow citizens to the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations have been traumatically affected by this experience.

The United Nations Emergency Force rendered distinguished service. Nothing became it less than the manner of its departure. All gratitude and appreciation are owed to the individuals who sustained its action. And if in the course of the recent combats United Nations personnel have fallen dead or wounded - as they have - then I join my voice in an expression of the most sincere regret.

The problem of the future role of a United Nations presence in conflicts such as these is being much debated. But we must ask ourselves a question that has arisen as a result of this experience. People in our country and in many countries ask: What is the use of a United Nations presence if it is in effect an umbrella which is taken away as soon as it begins to rain? Surely, then, future arrangements for peace-keeping must depend more on the agreement and the implementation of the parties themselves than on machinery which is totally at the mercy of the host country, so totally at its mercy as to be the instrument of its policies, whatever those policies may be.

We have lived through three dramatic weeks. Those weeks, I think, have brought into clear view the main elements of tension and also the chief promise of relaxed tension in the future. The first link in the chain was the series of sabotage acts emanating from Syria. In October of 1966, the Security Council was already

seized of this problem, and a majority of its member States found it possible and necessary to draw attention to the Syrian Government's responsibility for altering that situation. Scarcely a day passed without a mine, a bomb, a hand-grenade or a mortar exploding on Israel's soil, sometimes with lethal or crippling effects, always with an unsettling psychological influence. In general, fourteen or fifteen such incidents would accumulate before a response was considered necessary, and this ceaseless accumulation of terrorist sabotage incidents in the name of what was called "popular war", together with responses which in the long run sometimes inevitable, were for a long period the main focus of tension in the Middle East.

But then there came a graver source of tension in mid-May, when abnormal troop concentrations were observed in the Sinai Peninsula. For the ten years of relative stability beginning with March 1957 and ending with May 1967, the Sinai Desert had been free of Egyptian troops. In other words, a natural geographic barrier, a largely uninhabited space, separated the main forces of the two sides. It is true that in terms of sovereignty and law, any State has a right to put its armies in any part of its territory that it chooses. This, however, is not a legal question: it is a political and a security question.

Experience in many parts of the world, not least in our own, demonstrates that massive armies in close proximity to each other, against a background of a doctrine of belligerency and accompanying threats by one army to annihilate the other, constitute an inflammatory situation.

We were puzzled in Israel by the relative lack of preoccupation on the part of friendly Governments and international agencies with this intense concentration which found its reflection in precautionary concentrations on our side. My Government proposed, I think at least two weeks ago, the concept of a parallel and reciprocal reduction of forces on both sides of the frontier. We elicited no response, and certainly no action.

To these grave sources of tension - the sabotage and terrorist movement, emanating mostly from Syria, and the heavy troop concentrations accompanied by dire, apocalyptic threats in Sinai - there was added in the third week of May the most electric shock of all, namely the closure of the international waterway consisting of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. It is not difficult, I think, to understand why this incident had a more drastic impact than any other. In 1957 the maritime nations, within the framework of the United Nations General Assembly, correctly enunciated the doctrine of free and innocent passage through the Strait.

Now, when that doctrine was proclaimed - and incidentally, not challenged by the Egyptian representative at that time - it was little more than an abstract principle for the maritime world. For Israel it was a great but still unfulfilled prospect; it was not yet a reality. But during the ten years in which we and the other States of the maritime community have relied upon that doctrine and upon established usage, the principle has become a reality consecrated by hundreds of sailings under dozens of flags and the establishment of a whole complex of commerce and industry and communication. A new dimension has been added to the map of the world's communications, and on that dimension we have, constructed Israel's bridge towards the friendly States of Asia and Africa, a network of relationships which is the chief pride of Israel in the second decade of its independence.

All this, then, had grown up as an effective usage under the United Nations flag. Does Mr. Nasser really think that he can come upon the scene in ten minutes and cancel the established legal usage and interests of ten years?

There was in this wanton act a quality of malice. For surely the closing of the Strait of Tiran gave no benefit whatever to Egypt except the perverse joy of inflicting injury on others. It was an anarchic act, because it showed a total disregard for the law of nations, the application of which in this specific case had not been challenged for ten years. And it was, in the literal sense, an act of arrogance, because there are other nations in Asia and East Africa, that trade with the Port of Eilat, as they have every right to do, through the Strait of Tiran and across the Gulf of Aqaba. Other sovereign States from Japan to Ethiopia, from Thailand to

Uganda, from Cambodia to Madagascar, have a sovereign right to decide for themselves whether they wish or do not wish to trade with Israel. These countries are not colonies of Cairo. They can trade with Israel or not trade with Israel as they wish, and President Nasser is not the policeman of other African and Asian States.

Here then was a wanton intervention in the sovereign rights of other States in the eastern half of the world to decide for themselves whether or not they wish to establish trade relations with either or both of the two ports at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba.

When we examine, then, the implications of this act, we have no cause to wonder that the international shock was great. There was another reason too for that shock. Blockades have traditionally been regarded, in the pre-Charter parlance, as acts of war. To blockade, after all, is to attempt strangulation; and sovereign States are entitled not to have their trade strangled. To understand how the State of Israel felt, one has merely to look around this table and imagine, for example, a foreign Power forcibly closing New York or Montreal, Boston or Marseille, Toulon or Copenhagen, Rio or Tokyo or Bombay harbor. How would your Governments react? What would you do? How long would you wait?

But Israel waited because of its confidence that the other maritime Powers and countries interested in this new trading pattern would concert their influence in order to re-establish a legal situation and to liquidate this blockade. We concerted action with them not because Israel's national interest was here abdicated. There will not be, there cannot be, an Israel without Eilat. We cannot be expected to return to a dwarfed stature, with our face to the Mediterranean alone. In law and in history, peace and blockades have never co-existed. How could it be expected that the blockade of Eilat and a relaxation of tension in the Middle East could ever be brought into harmony?

These then were the three main elements in the tension: the sabotage movement; the blockade of the port; and, perhaps more imminent than anything else, this vast and purposeful encirclement movement, against the background of an authorized presidential statement announcing that the objective of the encirclement was to bring about the destruction and the annihilation of a sovereign State.

These acts taken together - the blockade, the dismissal of the United Nations Emergency Force, and the heavy concentration in Sinai - effectively disrupted the status quo which had ensured a relative stability on the Egyptian-Israel frontier for ten years. I do not use the words "relative stability" lightly, for in fact while those elements in the Egyptian-Israel relationship existed there was not one single incident of violence between Egypt and Israel for ten years. But suddenly this status quo, this pattern of mutually accepted stability, was smashed to smithereens. It is now the task of the Governments concerned to elaborate the new conditions of their co-existence. I think that much of this work should be done directly by these Governments themselves. Surely, after what has happened we must have better assurance than before, for Israel and for the Middle East, of peaceful co-existence. The question is whether there is any reason to believe that such a new era may yet come to pass. If I am a little sanguine on this point, it is because of a conviction that men and nations do behave wisely once they have exhausted all other alternatives. Surely the other alternatives of war and belligerency have now been exhausted. And what has anybody gained from that? But in order that the new system of inter-State relationships may flourish in the Middle East, it is important that certain principles be applied above and beyond the cease-fire to which the Security Council has given its unanimous support.

Let me then say here that Israel welcomes the appeal for the cease-fire as formulated in this Resolution. But I must point out that the implementation depends on the absolute and sincere acceptance and co-operation of the other parties, which, in our view, are responsible for the present situation. And in conveying this Resolution to my colleagues, I must at this moment point out that these other Governments have not used the opportunity yet to clarify their intentions.

I have said that the situation to be constructed after the cease-fire must depend on certain principles. The

first of these principles surely must be the acceptance of Israel's statehood and the total elimination of the fiction of its non-existence. It would seem to me that after 3,000 years the time has arrived to accept Israel's nationhood as a fact, for here is the only State in the international community which has the same territory, speaks the same language and upholds the same faith as it did 3,000 years ago.

And if, as everybody knows to be the fact, the universal conscience was in the last week or two most violently shaken at the prospect of danger to Israel, it was not only because there seemed to be a danger to a State, but also, I think, because the State was Israel, with all that this ancient name evokes, teaches, symbolizes and inspires. How grotesque would be an international community which found room for 122 sovereign units and which did not acknowledge the sovereignty of that people which had given nationhood its deepest significance and its most enduring grace.

No wonder, then, that when danger threatened we could hear a roar of indignation sweep across the world, that men in progressive movements and members of the scientific and humanistic cultures joined together in sounding an alarm bell about an issue that vitally affected the human conscience. And no wonder, correspondingly, that a deep and universal sense of satisfaction and relief has accompanied the news of Israel's gallant and successful resistance.

But the central point remains the need to secure an authentic intellectual recognition by our neighbors of Israel's deep roots in the Middle Eastern reality. There is an intellectual tragedy in the failure of Arab leaders to come to grips, however reluctantly, with the depth and authenticity of Israel's roots in the life, the history, the spiritual experience and the culture of the Middle East.

This, then, is the first axiom. A much more conscious and uninhibited acceptance of Israel's statehood is an axiom requiring no demonstration, for there will never be a Middle East without an independent and sovereign State of Israel in its midst.

The second principle must be that of the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Resolution thus adopted falls within the concept of the peaceful settlement of disputes. I have already said that much could be done if the Governments of the area would embark much more on direct contacts. They must find their way to each other. After all, when there is conflict between them they come together face to face. Why should they not come together face to face to solve the conflict? And perhaps on some occasions it would not be a bad idea to have the solution before, and therefore instead of, the conflict.

When the Council discusses what is to happen after the cease-fire, we hear many formulas: back to 1956, back to 1948 - I understand our neighbors would wish to turn the clock back to 1947. The fact is, however, that most clocks move forward and not backward, and this, I think, should be the case with the clock of Middle Eastern peace - not backward to belligerency, but forward to peace.

The point was well made this evening by the representative of Argentina, who said: the cease-fire should be followed immediately by the most intensive efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. In a similar sense, the representative of Canada warned us against merely reproducing the old positions of conflict, without attempting to settle the underlying issues of Arab-Israel co-existence. After all, many things in recent days have been mixed up with each other. Few things are what they were. And in order to create harmonious combinations of relationships, it is inevitable that the States should come together in negotiation.

Another factor in the harmony that we would like to see in the Middle East relates to external Powers. From these, and especially from the greatest amongst them, the small States of the Middle East - and most of them are small - ask for a rigorous support, not for individual States, but for specific principles; not to be for one State against other States, but to be for peace against war, for free commerce against belligerency, for the pacific settlement of disputes against violent irredentist threats; in other words, to exercise an even-handed support for the integrity and independence of States and for the rights of States under the Charter of the

There are not two categories of States. The United Arab Republic, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon - not one of these has a single ounce or milligram. of statehood which does not adhere in equal measures to Israel itself.

It is important that States outside our region apply a balanced attitude, that they do not exploit temporary tensions and divergences in the issues of global conflict, that they do not seek to win gains by inflaming fleeting passions, and that they strive to make a balanced distribution of their friendship amongst the States of the Middle East. Now whether all the speeches of all the Great Powers this evening meet this criterion, everybody, of course, can judge for himself. I do not propose to answer in detail all the observations of the representative of the Soviet Union. I had the advantage of hearing the same things in identical language a few days ago from his colleague, the Soviet Ambassador in Israel. I must confess that I was no more convinced this evening than I was the day before yesterday about the validity of this most vehement and one-sided denunciation. But surely world opinion, before whose tribunal this debate unrolls, can solve this question by posing certain problems to itself. Who was it that attempted to destroy a neighboring State in 1948, Israel or its neighbors? Who now closes an international waterway to the port of a neighboring State, Israel or the United Arab Republic? Does Israel refuse to negotiate a peace settlement with the Arab States, or do they refuse to do so with it? Who disrupted the 1957 pattern of stability, Israel or Egypt? Did troops of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait and Algeria surround Israel in this menacing confrontation, or has any distinguished representative seen some vast Israel colossus surrounding the area between Morocco and Kuwait?

I raise these points of elementary logic. Of course, a Great Power can take refuge in its power from the exigencies of logic. All of us in our youth presumably recounted La Fontaine's fable, "La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure." But here, after all, there is nobody who is more or less strong than others; we sit here around the table on the concept of sovereign equality. But I think we have an equal duty to bring substantive proof for any denunciation that we make, each of the other.

I would say in conclusion that these are, of course, still grave times. And yet they may perhaps have a fortunate issue. This could be the case if those who for some reason decided so violently, three weeks ago, to disrupt the status quo would ask themselves what the results and benefits have been. As he looks around him at the arena of battle, at the wreckage of planes and tanks, at the collapse of intoxicated hopes, might not an Egyptian ruler ponder whether anything was achieved by that disruption? What has it brought but strife, conflict with other powerful interests, and the stem criticism of progressive men throughout the world?

I think that Israel has in recent days proved its steadfastness and vigor. It is now willing to demonstrate its instinct for peace. Let us build a new system of relationships from the wreckage of the old. Let us discern across the darkness the vision of a better and a brighter dawn.

V. Telegram from Israel PM to U.S. President Johnson Justifying Military Action⁵⁹

Following are direct excerpts from a telegram that Israeli PM Levi Eshkol's sent to U.S. President Johnson explaining Israel's case for war. The telegram (full text below) was delivered on June 5, 1967 an hour and a half after Israel began air strikes on Egyptian airfields. He listed the following justifications for war.

- *The provocative troop concentrations in Sinai. Including placing of more than 900 Egyptian tanks against our southern frontier; the massing of 400 tanks opposite Eilat with the object of sundering the southern Negev from Israel.*
- *The illegal blockade in the Straits of Tiran and the insolent defiance of the international and maritime community.*
- *The policy of strangling encirclement of which the first stage was the intimidation of Jordan and the most recent, the placing there of Iraqi troops and Egyptian commando regiments and the imminent introduction of MIG 21 aircraft under Iraqi command in Mafraq.*
- *Nasser's announcement of 'total war against Israel' and of his basic aim to annihilate Israel. (see note above⁶⁰).*
- *The order of the day by the Egyptian Commander General Murtagi calling on his troops in Sinai to wage a war of destruction against Israel.*
- *The acts of sabotage and terrorism from Syria and Gaza.*
- *The recent air encroachments culminating in this morning's engagements and the bombardment by Egypt of Kisufim, Nahal Oz and Tsur Maon in Israel territory.*

NOTE: Despite Israel's clear diplomatic efforts and disinterest in engaging in a war with the Arabs, on May 17 and also on May 24, Egyptian MiG aircraft penetrated Israeli airspace over the Negev and photographed Israel's most sensitive strategic sight, a nuclear reactor in Dimona.¹ Additionally, it is now known that Egypt had planned to launch a military offensive just nine days before Israel began air strikes on June 5. On May 26, Israel obtained intelligence indicating that Egypt and Syria were planning to launch a war of annihilation against Israel within the next 48 hours. The military offensive planned by Egyptian General, Abdul Hakim Amer, dubbed "The Dawn," was essentially a march from Sinai to Jordan, cutting Israel in half. President Nasser ordered Amer to call it off only minutes before the attack was set to begin. Pressure by the United States to prevent all-out war, and by the Soviets, who were concerned that Egypt would be blamed for starting the conflict, both influenced Nasser's decision.

FULL TEXT:

"Dear Mr. President: After weeks in which our peril has grown day by day, we are now engaged in repelling the aggression which Nasser has been building up against us. Israel's existence and integrity have been endangered. The provocative troop concentrations in Sinai, now amounting to five infantry and two armored divisions: the placing of more that 900 tanks against our southern frontier; the massing of 400 tanks opposite Eilat with the object of sundering the southern Negev from Israel; the illegal blockade in the Straits of Tiran; the insolent defiance of the international and maritime community; the policy of strangling encirclement of which the first stage was the intimidation of Jordan and the most recent-the

59 "Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 Six Days of War, June 5-10, 1967," The U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xix/28058.htm>, (Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR).

60 Oren, Michael, "The Six-Day War and it's Enduring Legacy," The Washington Institute, July 2, 2002, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/print.php?template=C05&CID=2080>

placing there of Iraqi troops and Egyptian commando regiments, the imminent introduction of MIG 21 aircraft under Iraqi command in Mafraq; Nasser's announcement of 'total war against Israel' and of his basic aim to annihilate Israel; the order of the day by the Egyptian Commander General Murtagi calling on his troops in Sinai to wage a war of destruction against Israel; the acts of sabotage and terrorism from Syria and Gaza; the recent air encroachments culminating in this morning's engagements and the bombardment by Egypt of Kisufim, Nahal Oz and Tsur Maon in Israel territory--all of this amounts to an extraordinary catalogue of aggression, abhorred and condemned by world opinion and in your great country and amongst all peace loving nations.

As you know, Mr. President, nothing effective had been done or attempted by the UN against a ruthless design to destroy the state of Israel which embodies the memories, sacrifices and hopes of an ancient people, which in a generation lost 6 million of its people brutally murdered in a tragedy without parallel in history.

Mr. President, I am grateful for the friendship expressed in your letters; for your appreciation of our steadfastness and calm; for your policy of protecting the territorial integrity of Israel and other nations; for your undertaking to provide effective American support to preserve the peace and freedom of Israel and the Middle East; and for your undertaking to pursue vigorous measures to keep the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba open as an international waterway to ships of all nations.

These are impressive commitments. Your letter mentions the obstacles which have so far made action difficult. We rely on the courage and determination of our soldiers and citizens. Indeed maximum self-reliance is the central aim of our national revival. My information is that our defense is reaping success. But our trials are not over. We are confident that our small nation can count on the fealty and resolution of its greatest friend.

We seek nothing but peaceful life within our territory, and the exercise of our legitimate maritime rights.

I hope that everything will be done by the United States to prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting and enlarging the conflict. The hour of danger can also be an hour of opportunity. It is possible to create conditions favorable to the promotion of peace and the strengthening of forces of freedom in the area.

At this critical moment I should welcome the closest consultation between our governments at all levels.

Israel appeals, Mr. President, to your friendship, your fidelity and your leadership."

VI. United Nations Security Council Resolution S/233, 6 June 1967⁶¹

The Security Council,

*Noting the oral report of the Secretary-General in this situation,
Having heard the statements made in the Council,
Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,*

1. Calls upon the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area;

⁶¹ "Security Council Resolution 233 (1967)," United Nations, S/Res/233 (1967), June 6, 1967, <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/d744b47860e5c97e85256c40005d01d6/cee5b4e9f80ed573852560c3004b16fb!OpenDocument>

2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

Adopted unanimously at the 1348th meeting.

VII. United Nations Security Council Resolution S/234, 7 June 1967⁶²

The Security Council,

Noting that, in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East (resolution 233 (1967), military activities in the area are continuing,

Concerned that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area,

1. Demands that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation.

Adopted unanimously at the 1350th meeting.

VIII. United Nations Security Council Resolution S/235, 9 June 1967⁶³

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June and 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967,

Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,

Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,

1. Confirms its previous resolutions about immediate cease-fire and cessation of military action;

2. Demands that hostilities should cease forthwith;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now.

Adopted unanimously at the 1352nd meeting.

⁶² "Security Council Resolution 234 (1967)," United Nations, S/Res/234, June 7, 1967, <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/d744b47860e5c97e85256c40005d01d6/790e13c4b20cd98c852560c3004b2a14!OpenDocument>

⁶³ "Security Council Resolution 235 (1967)," United Nations, S/Res/235, June 9, 1967, <http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/d744b47860e5c97e85256c40005d01d6/a3dd0e9bf5ce1c4f852560c3004b434e!OpenDocument>

The Khartoum Conference, September 1, 1967

The Khartoum Conference was the Arab response to Israeli diplomatic peace efforts following the Six-Day War. **Israel offered to return the Golan to Syria, the West Bank to Jordan and the Sinai to Egypt in exchange for a just and lasting peace, recognized borders and normalized relations.**⁶⁴

However, the Arab leaders rejected Israel's offer for peace.

Between August 29 and September 1, 1967, eight Arab leaders and heads of State gathered in the Sudanese capital of Khartoum to discuss which diplomatic route to take with Israel.

The seven key resolutions decided at the Arab summit in Khartoum would guide Arab foreign policy toward Israel for years to come. The Arab consensus was:

1. **NO to peace with Israel**
2. **NO to recognition of Israel**
3. **NO to negotiations with Israel**

Egypt was the first to breach the resolutions of the Khartoum conference when President Anwar Sadat signed a peace agreement with Israel after the 1973 war.

Text of Khartoum Conference Resolutions⁶⁵

1. The conference has affirmed the unity of Arab ranks, the unity of joint action and the need for coordination and for the elimination of all differences. The Kings, Presidents and representatives of the other Arab Heads of State at the conference have affirmed their countries' stand by and implementation of the Arab Solidarity Charter which was signed at the third Arab summit conference in Casablanca.

2. The conference has agreed on the need to consolidate all efforts to eliminate the effects of the aggression on the basis that the occupied lands are Arab lands and that the burden of regaining these lands falls on all the Arab States.

3. The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country.

4. The conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil recommended that suspension of oil pumping be used as a weapon in the battle. However, after thoroughly studying the matter, the summit conference has come to the conclusion that the oil pumping can itself be used as a positive weapon, since oil is an Arab resource which can be used to

⁶⁴ Isseroff, Ami, "Khartoum Resolutions," MidEastWeb. Retrieved April 29, 2007, from <http://www.mideastweb.org/khartoum.htm>

⁶⁵ The Avalon Project, "The Khartoum Resolutions; September 1, 1967," Yale University, March 30, 2007, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/khartoum.htm>

strengthen the economy of the Arab States directly affected by the aggression, so that these States will be able to stand firm in the battle. The conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to enable those Arab States which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and eliminate the effects of the aggression. The oil-producing States have, in fact, participated in the efforts to enable the States affected by the aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure.

5. The participants in the conference have approved the plan proposed by Kuwait to set up an Arab Economic and Social Development Fund on the basis of the recommendation of the Baghdad conference of Arab Ministers of Finance, Economy and Oil.

6. The participants have agreed on the need to adopt the necessary measures to strengthen military preparation to face all eventualities.

7. The conference has decided to expedite the elimination of foreign bases in the Arab States.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242

November 22, 1967

Wording of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 242—unanimously passed on Nov. 22, 1967—intentionally excludes three definitive terms within the context of territory obtained by Israel as a result of the Six-Day War: ⁶⁶

- 1. “The”**
- 2. “All”**
- 3. “June 5, 1967 lines”**

UNSC Resolution 242 does not call for Israel to withdraw from “all” of “the” territories gained during the Six-Day War of June 5 – June 10, 1967, nor that Israel withdraw to “June 5, 1967 lines.” The resolution is absent of these three words, because the UNSC wanted to ensure that an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 Armistice Line would result in a just and lasting peace agreement. Below is commentary by United States Ambassador to the U.N., Arthur J. Goldberg, who assisted in drafting resolution 242.

“The cease-fire resolutions adopted during and after the Six Day War differed in substance from Security Council resolutions relating to the Israeli-Arab wars waged during the preceding nineteen years. In the earlier resolutions, calls for a cease-fire were invariably accompanied by demands for the withdrawal of troops to positions held before the conflicts erupted. In June 1967, however, provisions for withdrawal were not incorporated in the cease-fire resolutions. This provision was not omitted by accident. Instead, the omission reflected the reaction by a majority of the members of the Security Council to the events that led to the outbreak of war. As the debates revealed, the majority of the members of the Security Council were unwilling to vote for the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces because of their conviction that a return to the armistice regime would not serve the goal of securing a just and lasting peace between the parties.”

Text of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242⁶⁷

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and

66 Conclusions noted here are from: Goldberg, Arthur, J., “U.N. Resolution 242: Origin, meaning, and significance” National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Security Interests, April 2002, <http://www.ncafp.org/projects/MiddleEast/UNres242.htm>

67 “Security Council Resolution 242 – 22 November 1967,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nov. 22, 1967, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/32+Security+Council+Resolution+242-+22+November+19.htm>

lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representative as soon as possible.

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
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1967 Six-Day War Map Index

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Israel's Strategic Vulnerability, Pre-1967




Courtesy: Information Regarding Israel's Security (<http://www.iris.org.il/>)

Events Leading to the Six-Day War




Courtesy: MFA

The Jordanian Front




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The Egyptian Front




Courtesy: Middle East Maps (<http://www.dartmouth.edu/~gov4>)

The Battle for Jerusalem



Courtesy: Middle East Maps (<http://www.dartmouth.edu/~gov46/>)

The Geo-Strategic Threat from the Golan Today



Courtesy: The Jewish Connection (<http://www.geocities.com/Colosseum/Loge/7748/>)

The Golan Heights and the Greater Middle East



Courtesy: The Jewish Connection (<http://www.geocities.com/Colosseum/Logo/7748/>)